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The choice of chemical process routes is one of the key decisions in the early 
design stages. Choosing an “inherently safer” route will help eliminate many hazards 
as well as obviate many risk control devices later used in the process. Many methods 
have been proposed to assess the inherent safety level of chemical process route. 
Among them, inherent safety indices seem to have been the preferred approach. 
Inherent safety indices have been developed by many different authors such as 
Lawrence (1996), Heikkilä (1999), and Palaniappan et al. (2002). These indices have 
the same framework for assessing chemical properties of a route, that is, using various 
measures such as the Dow Index or National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
ratings (NFPA, 1994) to quantify safety and environmental impact of materials, 
reactions, etc. Usually routes involving more reactive, toxic chemicals and hazardous 
reactions are considered less safe and therefore less preferred. The first part of the 
thesis critically evaluates the basis for this principle. 
Recently, a review of selected 167 reactive incidents in the United States from 
a 22 year period was published by the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board (US CSB, 2002). They found that about 90% of the incidents involved 
chemicals that would be considered safer by common Inherent Safety indices (NFPA 
ratings ≤ 2). Using statistical hypothesis testing, we have shown that NFPA  ratings, a 
common component in the Inherent Safety metrics, do not predict very well the 
occurrence of incidents or the extent of their consequences. This shows that the NFPA 
and related ratings do not produce a good assessment of a process’ safety level.  
 iv
Other aspects such as process operating conditions, health and environmental 
aspects have also been commonly used to measure Inherent Safety. However, such 
indices have many shortcomings such as subjective scaling and weighting of factors, 
consideration of limited set of aspects, etc. To overcome these, in the second part of 
this thesis, we propose a statistical analysis-based methodology for comparing process 
routes. An easy-to-use, extendable, theoretically sound approach to compare 
competing routes is developed and illustrated using case studies. Results and their 
significance can be visually represented. Our methodology uses Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) method to analyze Safety, Health and Environmental aspects of each 
process route, and determine broad similarities and differences between routes. Based 
on this, process routes can also be ranked for the purpose of choosing the best route. 
The proposed methodology is illustrated using three case studies and its advantages 
and shortcomings highlighted. 
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 Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Accident prevention is one of the most important considerations in a plant. 
Especially after many high-impact disasters such as Flixborough (1974), Seveso 
(1976) and Bhopal (1984), many methods were suggested to prevent such accidents, 
ranging from fire protection to alarms and process control. Among these methods, in 
1978, Dr. T. A. Kletz promoted the philosophy of hazard elimination and hazard 
reduction and gave it the name “Inherently Safer design”.  
An example of an inherently safer plant is one that uses less hazardous 
materials, in smaller quantities, and at lower temperatures and pressures. These factors 
make the plant inherently safer than other plants because the hazards have been 
reduced or even removed. In order to achieve inherent safety, many design strategies 
have been developed such as intensification, substitution, attenuation, simplification 
and limitation. These strategies should be applied in the early process design stages as 
it will be cheaper and easier to change a design at these early stages. 
Nowadays, a plant which is safe, healthy and environmentally friendly is 
preferred. There have been many methods developed for the purpose of choosing an 
inherently safer, healthier, and environmentally friendlier process. However, they still 
contain some shortcomings, which provide the motivation for this thesis.  
A report from US Chemical Safety Board (CSB 2002) reported details of 167 
reactive incidents in the US from 1980 to 2001. Analysis of this database shows that 
only 10% of the 167 known incidents involved chemicals with National Fire Protection 
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 Association (NFPA) ratings of “3” or “4”. The NFPA and related ratings are used in 
many inherent safety indices to score the chemical safety of a process. It is clear 
therefore that the NFPA ratings are insufficient as the basis for determining hazards. 
In this thesis, a multivariate approach using Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) is proposed to assess safety, health and environmental aspects of process routes 
in the early design stages. The motivation for this work is the shortcomings of the 
previous index-based approaches to assess inherent safety of process routes. These 
indices use subjective scaling and  subjective weighting in scoring their sub-indices. 
They also consider limited set of effects in a process as they assess only one or two of 
the factors among inherent safety, health and environment. However, all three key 
factors need to be considered together in process design. The simplicity of use is a 
major criterion for use in industry as indicated by Gupta and Edwards (2003). So there 
is a need to develop a new method that can overcome the shortcomings of these 
methods yet is easy-to-use. We propose a new method, using PCA, that can overcome 
these disadvantages and is also easy-to-use, extendable and theoretically sound for 
analyzing competing process routes. The methodology can be used not only to rank the 
routes, but also to point out the similarities and differences between them. Thus, the 
analysis results from our method can show what the most extreme factor is in a 
process, so that a thorough risk management plan for the process can be developed. 
The “extendibility” property of the methodology presented gives it the ability to be 
used in later stages of process design also, when more process details are available. 
Thus, we can easily add more aspects such as economics and human factors when such 
information becomes available. This gives us more options to include additional 
hazard indicators as well as more opportunities for satisfying new constraints in the 
future. 
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 Chapter 2 reviews the literature of inherent safety assessment. Some basic 
concepts of inherent safety and inherently safer design are also introduced. Besides, 
the advantages and shortcomings of previous methods are analyzed. Some other 
methods which integrated inherent safety, health and environmental aspects are also 
reviewed. The chapter ends with an overall review of the previous index-based 
methods, their common shortcomings and the challenges. 
Chapter 3 reports the statistical hypothesis testing on the data from a CSB 
report on 167 selected reactive incidents in the United States from 1980 to 2001. The 
method of analysis using t-test is detailed along with a discussion on the data limits 
and reliability. The results of these t-tests are then analyzed and discussed. The chapter 
finishes with some conclusions on the relationship between the NFPA ratings and the 
incidents. This also motivates the need for an alternative approach to Inherent Safety 
measurement. 
Chapter 4 presents the new multivariate approach for assessing safety, health 
and environmental aspects of process routes in early design stages. An introduction is 
presented for each effect factor, and the reason why it should be used. The chapter also 
proposes an objective approach to scaling the Safety, Health and Environmental 
aspects.  
In Chapter 5, the application of the proposed multivariate approach for 
manufacturing routes of Acetic Acid, Phenol and MMA is illustrated. A comparison of 
the multivariate approach and previous index-based approaches is also provided. 
Finally, the thesis is concluded and recommendations as well as some future 
directions are proposed in Chapter 6. 
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 Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction to Inherent Safety and Inherently Safer Design 
One of the key requirements of process is its safety. Process safety can be 
enhanced by using hazard control devices to control the identified hazards. With the 
advances in technology today, hazard control systems can be made highly reliable; 
however, they cannot be always perfect and there is always some chance for failure to 
happen (Mannan, 2005). Also, the hazard management systems require more 
maintenance, operator training and management throughout the life cycle of the 
process. This will definitely increase cost. The industries always want a process which 
is acceptably safe and without a lot of devices. Hence, an “inherently safer” process is 
preferred. 
An “inherently safe” plant is safe by its nature and by the way it is constituted. 
No facility can be completely “inherently safe,” but they can be made “inherently 
safer” by careful examination of all aspects of plant design and management. 
Inherent safety is generally achieved by applying five key principles: 
• Intensification/Minimization: The quantity of hazardous materials and energy 
should be minimized at all places in a plant, including all inventories and 
piping. “Materials” here refers to all raw materials, intermediate and products. 
This minimization strategy can be achieved by improving mixing or heat 
transfer, increasing reaction rates, using of catalysts, and thus reducing the size 
of equipment containing hazardous materials. Moreover, the use of smaller 
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 equipment may make it feasible to use other risk management strategies which 
would be impractical or prohibitively expensive for larger equipment (Mannan, 
2005). 
• Substitution: Using safer materials and safer chemical synthesis routes. The use 
of a safer chemical synthesis route is one of the best options for improving 
inherent safety; however, this requires a thorough consideration of different 
synthesis routes from the early design stages of a process as it is not easy to 
change an existing synthesis route. This thesis focuses on this approach of 
Inherent Safety. In choosing a safer material, it is necessary to consider the 
environmental impact of the material also, as some material may be safer in 
safety aspect but has more environmental impact, for e.g. CFCs.   
• Attenuation/Moderation: Changing the conditions during a reaction or unit 
operation will help reduce hazards. This principle can be achieved by 
moderating the hazards of materials or processes. Hazardous materials can be 
diluted with a less hazardous material. Storage of liquids in refrigerated 
conditions at atmospheric pressure is preferred to pressurized storage. 
Replacing a dusty powder by a granule or pellet can help reduce the potential 
of dust explosions. Processes are less hazardous when operated away from 
temperatures where runaway reactions are possible, or when operated away 
from flammable limits. 
• Simplification: Inherent safety can be achieved by reducing the opportunities 
for error and malfunction. As chemical plants become increasingly complex, 
operations become more complicated too. Consequently, there is more chance 
for human errors and greater chance for equipment to fail. Hence, making the 
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 plant simpler by design is preferred. Many strategies can be employed for this 
purpose such as eliminating unnecessary or seldom used piping, using of 
gravity flow instead of pumps, making incorrect operation impossible, or 
designing equipment and systems taking into account good human factors.  
• Limitation of Effects: When there is still possibility for something to go wrong, 
methods to minimize the effects of potential accidents should be adopted. 
Limiting the addition of energy by lowering temperatures or pressures is an 
example. Another example is reducing the chance for unwanted reactions by 
charging chemicals into more than one reactor rather than charging all 
chemicals to one reactor in a certain order so that only the correct chemicals 
will react.  
During process design, there are many constraints which have to be satisfied 
such as economics, safety, health and environmental factors. However, there are 
always some conflicts between safety and health and environmental aspects. One 
example of such conflicts is the use of CFC refrigerants. CFCs are not flammable and 
have low acute toxicity. They are “inherently safer” with respect to the flammability 
and acute personnel exposure. However, nowadays people realize that those CFCs can 
cause ozone depletion. Hence, they are not benign in terms of environmental impact. 
The challenge is to find the optimum combination of these factors that best meets the 
overall objectives.   
The opportunities for installing “inherently safer” features are highest in the 
initial stages of process design, when it is easier to change the design features. 
Therefore, the best time to apply Inherent Safety principles is during route selection 
stage. 
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 2.2 Index-Based approaches for assessing Inherent Safety 
Edwards and Lawrence index (Mewis et al., 1995; Lawrence, 1996) – 
Prototype Index for Inherent Safety (PIIS) was the first ever index that was developed. 
It consists of seven parameters - Inventory, Temperature, Pressure, Yield, Toxicity, 
Flammability and Explosiveness. Edwards and Lawrence illustrated their approach by 
comparing six routes of MMA manufacture. They divided the total ranges that each of 
these parameters could possibly take into several sub-ranges and gave numerical scores 
for each of these sub-ranges. Flammability score was based on flash point and boiling 
point of chemicals, Explosiveness was based on the difference between Upper 
Explosive Limit (UEL) and Lower Explosive Limit (LEL), and Toxicity was based on 
Threshold Limit Value (TLV). One thing to note is that these numerical scores were 
taken from existing indices such as the Dow Fire and Explosion index (Dow Chemical 
Company, 1994) and the Mond index (Imperial Chemical Industries Limited , 1980) or 
by their own judgment. 
In each step of each route, they noted all the operating pressure, temperature, 
yield, flammability, toxicity and explosiveness for each of all the reactants, products 
and intermediates. The worst chemical for flammability, toxicity and explosiveness 
scores was chosen for each step. Then for each route, these scores were added together 
and called the “chemical score” for the route. Similarly, the scores for each step for 
pressure, temperature and yield were also added and called the “process score”. These 
two sets of scores were added together to get a score for each route. The route with the 
highest numerical value was taken to be the worst route. There was no weighting for 
each of the terms in the overall index. 
This index of Edwards and Lawrence has been modified by other workers. 
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 Table 2.1: Temperature scoring table (Lawrence, 1996) 
Temperature (°C) Score 
   T < -25 10 
-25 ≤ T < -10 3 
-10 ≤ T < 10 1 
10 ≤ T < 30 0 
30 ≤ T < 100 1 
100 ≤ T < 200 2 
200 ≤ T < 300 3 
300 ≤ T < 400 4 
400 ≤ T < 500 5 
500 ≤ T < 600 6 
600 ≤ T < 700 7 
700 ≤ T < 800 8 
800 ≤ T < 900 9 
900 ≤ T     10 
Heikkilä and Hurme (Heikkilä et al., 1996; Heikkilä, 1999) proposed their 
Inherent Safety Index (ISI). They claimed that both the chemical and equipment 
properties affect the safety of a process. Hence, they included a “type of equipment” 
parameter. They also added other parameters such as heat of main and side reactions, 
corrosiveness, chemical interaction and safety of process structure. Their inherent 
safety index is the total of Chemical Inherent Safety Index (ICI) and Process Inherent 
Safety Index (IPI). The ICI and IPI are the summations of respective worst-case values 
of the sub-indices for various parameters. The ranges for each parameter of their 
method are sometimes significantly different from those of Edwards and Lawrence. 
One such example is their scoring ranges for the Temperature parameter. While 
Edwards and Lawrence considered a temperature < -25 °C a significant threat and gave 
it the maximum score of 10, Heikkilä and Hurme gave all the temperatures below 0 °C 
only a score of 1 (the lowest score is 0). This shows that these index-based approaches 
are subjective in assigning the score for each parameter. Moreover, the scaling range of 
Edwards and Lawrence is from 0 to 10, while that of Heikkilä and Hurme is only from 
0 to 4 (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2).  
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 Table 2.2: Determination of the process temperature sub-index IT  
(Heikkilä et al., 1996) 








Palaniappan et al. (Palaniappan, 2001; Palaniappan et al., 2002, 2004) 
developed another expansion over the previous indices. These authors added five other 
supplementary indices, viz: Hazardous Chemical Index (HCI), Hazardous Reaction 
Index (HRI), Total Chemical Index (TCI), Worst Chemical Index (WCI) and Worst 
Reaction Index (WRI). They also added one more aspect for chemical safety: 
Chemical Reactivity. These supplementary indices will be of use when the Overall 
Safety Index (OSI) for each route is close to each other. The scoring tables used in 
their methods are based on previous methods.  
Each chemical in a route has its Individual Chemical Index (ICI), which is 
calculated as a summation of indices assigned for Flammability (NF), Toxicity (NT), 
Explosiveness (NE) and NFPA Reactivity rating (NR). Overall Chemical Index (OCI) 
of a main reaction will be the maximum of all ICIs.  
Individual Reaction Index (IRI) is calculated as a summation of sub-indices for 
Temperature (RT), Pressure (RP), Yield (RY) and Heat of Reaction (RH). Overall 
Reaction Index (ORI) for a route is the summation of all IRIs and the maximum of RH 
of side reactions. 
Overall Safety Index for a route is the summation of all OCIs and ORI. Worst 
Chemical Index (WCI) for a reaction step is the summation of the maximum of all NR, 
NF, NT and NE in that step. Worst Reaction Index (WRI) is calculated the same way. 
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 The Total Chemical Index (TCI) for a route is calculated as the summation of all ICIs 
in that route. The results from their methods (applied for MMA manufacturing routes) 
were similar to those from Edwards and Lawrence’s method. 
Khan and Amyotte developed an Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) (Khan 
and Amyotte, 2003). 
I2SI = ISPI / HI (2.1) 
HI (Hazard Index) is a measure of damage potential of the process considering 
both hazards and available control measures. HI = DI / PHCI. DI is Damage Index 
ranging from 1 to 200, and PHCI is Process and Hazard Control Index, ranging from 1 
to 100. DI is a function of 4 parameters, namely fire and explosion, acute toxicity, 
chronic toxicity, and environment damage. PHCI is the summation of 10 control 
measures which are pressure, temperature, flow, level, concentration, inert venting, 
blast wall, fire resistance wall, and sprinkler system and forced dilution. 
ISPI (Inherent Safety Potential Index) accounts for the applicability of inherent 
safety principles. ISPI = ISI / PHCI. PHCI is the same as above in calculating of HI. 
ISI (Inherent Safety Index) is calculated using the HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) 
procedure, and takes values ranging from 1 to 200. 
The final I2SI value will give the assessment of process routes. If a route has 
I2SI greater than 1, it is an “inherently safer” route. I2SI has been applied to the six 
routes of MMA manufacturing, and the results are the same as those of Edwards and 
Lawrence. 
Shah et al. (2003) proposed another method for designing “inherently safer” 
processes and preventing accidents. They developed a hierarchical approach in which 
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 they divided a process into 4 different layers, viz: substance, reactivity, equipment and 
safety technology layer. These layers are assessed successively for non-idealities of 
different chemical process aspects and their degree in terms of inherent safety. For 
each non-ideality, a worst-case scenario is defined and analyzed to recommend 
possible preventive and protective measures. Thus the method also helps in identifying 
the technical measures that have to be taken in order to run the process better. 
Gentile et al. (2003) addressed the subjective and arbitrary factor caused by the 
interval-typed approaches in the calculation of previous indices. For example, Table 
2.2 shows a score of 0 for a temperature of 0 to 70, which suddenly jumps to 1 at 71. 
Thus, only a change in 1°C from 70 to 71 changes the score from 0 to 1. This happens 
to all the scoring tables by previous works. The authors used the fuzzy set theory to 
overcome the problem. Their calculated ISI is based on If-Then rules that describe the 
knowledge related to inherent safety. Each parameter is described by a linguistic 
variable whose range is divided into fuzzy sets. For each set, a membership function is 
defined which has a specific shape describing the physical behaviour of the set. 
The above works have addressed an important issue during early chemical 
process design stages, that is, assessing and evaluating safety level of process routes. 
These works use safety indices to compare routes, without the need of detailed 
information of each process such as Process Flow Diagram (PFD), plant siting layout, 
etc. These works are useful as they can be used for a brief and quick comparison of 
process route alternatives during early stage of process design. A summary of 




 Table 2.3: Summary of important index-based approaches 
Index Summary 
PIIS by Edwards 
and Lawrence 
(1996) 
Seven parameters considered: Inventory, Temperature, Pressure, 
Yield, Toxicity, Flammability and Explosiveness. Route with the 
highest index is the worst route. No weighting for each parameter. 
ISI by Heikkilä 
and Hurme’s 
(1999) 
Included “type of equipment”, Heat of reactions, Corrosiveness, 
Chemical interaction, etc. parameters to Edwards and Lawrence’s 





Expansion of previous indices. Five supplementary indices 
introduced. One more parameter added: Chemical Reactivity. 
Results similar to Edwards and Lawrence’s. 
I2SI by Khan 
and Amyotte 
(2003) 
Included 4 damage parameters and 10 control measures. Results 
similar to Edwards and Lawrence’s. 
  
2.3 Approaches for assessing Health and Environmental impact 
Safety is rarely considered in isolation. Nowadays, occupational health is one 
of the most important factors considered in chemical plant design. The earlier the 
healthiness of a proposed plant is considered, the greater the benefits. Hence, choosing 
a process route which has minimum potential health risks to humans, is important. 
Another important characteristic of a chemical process that needs to be considered is 
its impact on the environment. 
Cave and Edwards (1997) developed the Environmental Hazard Index (EHI) to 
rank routes by estimating the environmental impact of each route in case of a total 
release of chemical inventory. Their EHI is based on the inventory of the chemicals 
and the toxicity data LC50 and LD50. The lower the EHI the more environmentally 
friendly is the route. The method is a quick and simple approach to make effective use 
of available data. However, they did not assess other environmental impact such as 
global warming, ozone depletion potentials, etc. Their method to estimate the plant 
chemical inventory, a major parameter needed to calculate the EHI, is based on many 
broad assumptions, and thus it is not quite accurate.   
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 There are some tools available for calculating environment impact, but the 
WAR algorithm is perhaps the most practical environment impact calculation tool 
accomplished to date (Yang and Shi, 2000). In the WAR algorithm (Hilaly and Sikdar, 
1994; Cabezas et al.,1999), a potential environmental impact (I) of a chemical k in a 
nonproduct (NP) stream j of a process is expressed as INP=Mj ψk (where Mj is the 
mass flow rate of stream j,  is the mass fraction of chemical k in the nonproduct 
stream j, and ψk is the overall potential environmental impact of chemical k. The 










k lψ αψ=∑  (2.2) 
where αl is a relative weighting factor for impact category type l independent of 
chemical k, and ,
s
k lψ  is the specific potential environmental impact of chemical k for an 
environmental impact type l. αl varies from 0 to 10 according to local needs and 
policies. ,
s
k lψ  is calculated from the impact values from WAR GUI software (US EPA, 
2002). Eight environmental impact categories are calculated in WAR which can be 
subdivided into four environmental physical potential effects (acidification potential, 
global warming potential, ozone depletion and photochemical oxidation potential), two 
human toxicity effects (human toxicity potential by ingestion and human toxicity 
potential by inhalation or dermal exposure), and two ecotoxicity effects (aquatic and 
terrestrial). More details of these environmental impact are provided in Chapter 4 of 
the thesis. 
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 Koller et al. (2000) method assessed 11 different effect categories of safety, 
health and environmental (SHE) hazards, namely mobility, fire/explosion, 
reaction/decomposition, acute toxicity, irritation, chronic toxicity, air mediated effects, 
water mediated effects, solid waste, degradation and accumulation. For each substance 
and each effect category, the most reliable data was selected. Then the magnitude of 
each SHE problem is measured as a potential for danger and be reduced by 
technological measures. However, their index value for each effect category is given 
arbitrarily. The method presented offers a structured approach to assessing SHE of a 
process, but it did not show how to compare competing process routes. 
2.4 Advantages and challenges 
g the benign-ness of processes through indices as surveyed above. 




they were based on the authors’ judgment. In fact, the scoring tables proposed 
by different authors for the same parameter do not always match.  
The main attraction of the index-based approaches is their ability to reduce 
various factors related to the process design into one quantitative factor that can be 
used to ease decision-making. Their simplicity is also deemed to make them attractive 
for use in industry (Gupta and Edwards, 2003). This attraction lead to the plethora of 
research in assessin
Subjective scaling: Indices are based on different parameters (e.g.: 
Temperature, Toxicity, Heat of reaction, etc.) and their contributions to benign-
ness have to be quantified in some fashion. Existing indices have given scores 
for each parameter. Typically, physical or chemical properties are divided into 




disparate hazards destroys dimensionality (Gupta and Edwards, 2003). To add, 
all the terms should have the same dimension or be dimensionless.  
3. ny methods have considered limited set 
of effects as they assessed only one or two of the factors among inherent safety, 
health and environmental constraints.  
4. 
 the same safety level. 
In other words, the level of detail at which a difference in score can make the 
processes become significantly different, is not known.   
5. 
rameter is not available for a 
material, reaction or another element of a route. Comparing routes when data 
for one is not complete is a challenging problem. 
ffects of different parameters. 
Subjective weighting: Different aspects are weighed differently. Many authors 
have derived an overall index which is often the summation of the scores while 
there is no assurance if these scores can be added together or not. A
Comprehensive coverage: Further, ma
Granularity of the index is not known: It is not easy to tell, using existing 
indices, whether a process which scores 70 is safer than another process which 
scores 75 or not, or if these two processes have just about
Missing data: A number of factors are considered in any index. Difficulties 
commonly arise in practice when the value of a pa
Several decision-making tools have been developed for overcoming 
multivariate and scaling related issues in other domains, e.g., voting method, Kepner-
Tregoe decision analysis, Multi-attribute utility analysis, etc. (CCPS, 1995). However, 
these are very complex methods. Gupta & Edwards (2003) proposed a simple method 
for measuring inherent safety using a spider plot to compare MMA manufacturing 
routes. They argued that adding disparate hazards such as temperature, pressure, 
inventory, toxicity, flammability, etc. might conceal the e
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 A spid
In this thesis, we propose a statistical analysis-based methodology for 
comparing process routes that overcomes the above shortcomings of the index-based 
approach. Following the philosophy of Gupta & Edwards (2003), we seek an easy-to-
use, extendable, theoretically sound approach to analyze competing process routes. 
The methodology uses PCA method to analyze all three aspects - Inherent Safety, 
Health, and Environment, of each process route. 
er plot is however suitable with a small number of effects and is a simple 
method for visualizing each process route qualitatively.  
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 Chapter 3 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING OF CHEMICAL PLANT INCIDENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Modern chemical plants are usually large in scale and highly complex. 
Incidents in these plants often cause great loss, damage and injury to people, the 
environment, and property. Among chemical incidents, reactive incidents are one of 
the most dangerous types. Risk management for such scenarios has thus become an 
important part of process design and operation management these days. It is important 
to know Chemical Reactivity rating in the early stages of designing a process, 
conducting a stability analysis, reaction hazards assessment, and other safety or 
efficiency evaluations. 
3.1.1 Chemical Reactivity 
Chemical reactivity is a complex concept. To date, no single measure that 
completely characterizes all aspects of chemical reactivity has been developed (Crowl 
and Elwell, 2004). 
Chemical reactivity of a material is commonly measured through NFPA’s 
Reactivity rating (NR), which is used for characterizing the short-term acute hazards of 
the material in fire or emergency situations. It is derived from the instantaneous power 
density (IPD), i.e. the zero-order specific rate of energy release at standard temperature 
250ºC (NFPA, 1994). The reactivity rating number is used to describe such reactivity 
potentials as thermal stability, interaction with water, and gas generation, etc. It should 
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 be noted that chemical reactivity is not necessarily an intrinsic property of a single 
chemical substance. In fact, the severity of reactive hazards is influenced by process-
specific factors, such as operating temperatures, pressures, quantities handled, 
chemical concentrations, impurities with catalytic effects, and compatibility with other 
chemicals onsite. 
The NFPA rating system was originally intended to provide basic information 
to fire fighting, emergency, and other personnel, enabling them to more easily decide 
whether to evacuate the area or to commence emergency control procedures. In 
addition to these original goals, this rating system also provides laboratory personnel 
with an invaluable tool to help in establishing the appropriate level of personal 
protection that is required for working with a material and the correct method of 
storage and use that should be employed. 
The reactive rating measures a material's susceptibility to violent reaction - 
detonation, polymerization, explosion, etc. However, in reality, the violence of the 
reaction may be increased by addition of heat or pressure, by mixture with other 
materials to form fuel-oxidizer combinations, or by contact with incompatible 
substances or contaminants. Because of the complexity of these types of reactions, it is 
not straightforward to use a simple numeric scale to identify the degree of hazard. 
Rather situations involving reactive materials must be evaluated individually. The 
numeric rating is used to rank the ease, rate, and potential quantity of energy that may 
be released. 
In the NFPA rating system, chemicals are ranked in five levels based on the 
degree of reactivity hazards: 
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 Table 3.1: NFPA Reactivity ratings 
NFPA rating Reactivity hazards 
4 Materials which are readily capable of detonation or of explosive 
decomposition or reaction at normal temperatures and pressures. 
3 Materials which in themselves are capable of detonation or explosive 
reaction but require a strong initiating source or which must be heated 
under confinement before initiation or which react explosively with 
water. 
2 Materials which are normally unstable and readily undergo violent 
chemical change but do not detonate. Also materials which may react 
violently with water or which may form explosive mixtures with water. 
1 Materials which are normally stable, but which can become unstable at 
elevated temperatures and pressures or which may react with water 
with some release of energy but not violently. 
0 Materials which are normally stable, even under fire exposure 
conditions, and which are not reactive with water. 
 
3.1.2 NFPA’s Chemical Health and Fire ratings 
In addition to Chemical Reactivity rating, NFPA has also issued Chemical 
Health (NH) and Fire (NF) ratings. Both of these two ratings also have the same scale 
from 0 to 4 as Chemical Reactivity rating, with the rating of “0” means no threat at all 
and “4” means an extreme threat to human, the environment or property. 
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 The health rating is intended to provide emergency response personnel with an 
idea of the degree of danger posed by a specific material. It addresses only issues 
related to acute, or short-term, exposures, and does not consider the danger posed from 
chronic or long-term exposures. The disadvantage of this system is that it does not 
address exposure to carcinogenic or mutagenic materials. The standard is concerned 
only with exposure as related to respiratory or contact incidents, since ingestion is an 
unlikely scenario for fire fighters. 
The fire (or flammability) rating is dependent upon the ease of ignition of a 
material. Many materials will burn under one set of conditions but not under others. 
The numeric value is assigned based on the flashpoint (the minimum temperature at 
which a liquid gives off vapor in sufficient concentrations to allow the substance to 
ignite) of the material. The flashpoint supplies useful information regarding the degree 
of hazard. First, if the material has no flashpoint, it is not a flammable material. 
Second, if it has a flashpoint, it must be considered flammable or combustible. Also, 
the flashpoint can be used as an indication of susceptibility to ignition - lower 
flashpoints indicate increased susceptibility. 
3.1.3 Incident prevention and Inherent Safety 
In traditional plant design, the philosophy is to identify hazards and then add 
protective measures to control them. This method, which is usually called secondary 
prevention, reduces the probability of accidents. Bollinger et al. (1996) separated this 
secondary prevention into three categories: 
- Passive: Reducing or eliminating hazards by process and equipment 
design features which reduce either incident frequency or consequences 
without the active functioning of devices. 
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 - Active: Using engineered features such as controls, safety interlocks, 
and emergency shutdown systems to detect potentially hazardous 
process deviations and to take corrective action. 
- Procedural: Using management approaches such as operating 
procedures, administrative checks, and emergency response to prevent 
incidents or to minimize the effects of an incident.  
The Inherent Safety philosophy, usually considered as primary prevention 
method, aims to use safer chemicals and operating conditions to remove the possibility 
of accidents or reduce their consequences. Thus, in Inherently Safer Design, hazards 
are identified early and then avoided or at least minimized, so that accidents either 
cannot happen or their effects are minimal (Edwards, 2005). Inherent Safety can be 
understood as the approach to reduce the magnitude of the impact. This means that 
even if a chemical is considered inherently safer, there is still the probability of 
accidents if the secondary prevention layer is not good or strong enough. Or, in other 
words, accidents can happen with chemicals which are considered to be safe. This 
actually had happened when we look at the CSB’s report, when approximately 60% of 
the accidents happened involved with chemicals which their ratings are either “0” or 
not rated by NFPA. This is discussed in greater detail next. 
3.2 CSB’s Reactive incident report 
A reactive chemical incident is a sudden event involving an uncontrolled 
chemical reaction – with significant increases in temperature, pressure, and/ or gas 
evolution – that has the potential to cause, or has caused serious harm to people, 
property, or the environment (US CSB, 2002). 
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 In the CSB’s report, among several types of hazardous chemical reactivity, 
runaway reactions contributed to 35 percent of the incidents, chemical incompatibility 
to 36 percent, and impact-sensitive or thermally sensitive materials attributed to only 
10 percent of the incidents. A recent study by Balasubramanian and Louvar (2002) 
further confirmed that runaway reactions continue to be a significant cause of major 
accidents in the chemical industry. Reactive hazards remain a significant safety 
challenge in the chemical industry despite continual attention devoted to this problem. 
As it was recently emphasized at a roundtable at AIChE (AIChE, 2003) “there is little 
consensus about how to deal with reactive chemical hazards… representatives from 
government, industry, labor and the academic world agreed on one point: reactive 
chemical incidents pose a significant safety problem that must be addressed”. 
The term “incident” in the CSB’s report is defined as a sudden event involving 
an uncontrolled chemical reaction – with significant increases in temperature, pressure, 
and/or gas evolution – that has caused, or has the potential to cause, serious harm to 
people, property, or the environment. The incidents investigated are those where the 
primary cause was related to chemical reactivity such as chemical compatibility, 
runaway reactions, and impact-sensitive/ thermally sensitive chemicals. 
The CSB (US CSB, 2002; 2003) collected reactive incidents data from more 
than 40 different sources including industry and governmental databases and guidance 
documents; safety/loss prevention texts and journals; and industry association, 
professional society, insurance, and academic newsletters. 
CSB selected 167 serious incidents in the United States involving uncontrolled 
chemical reactivity over the 22 year period from January 1980 to June 2001. 48 of 
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 these incidents resulted in a total of 108 fatalities. 66% of these incidents were from 
the chemical manufacturing industry. 
Figure 3.1 below shows the percentage of incidents and the incidents’ chemical 






Not published in 
NFPA 49 or 325: 
36%
 
Figure 3.1: CSB’s NFPA Reactivity rating analysis of reactive incident data,  
1980-2001 
 
3.3 Statistical analysis of Reactive incidents data 
 The CSB’s report was used to critically advocate the common precept in 
Inherent Safety indices, that is, to answer the question “Are processes that are 
inherently less safe as measured by the indices more susceptible to accidents or have 
more severe accidents?” 
3.3.1 Data source and quality 
The 167 incidents collected by CSB are used in our analysis. We updated the 
NFPA ratings (including Health, Fire and Reactivity ratings) for each chemical in the 
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 incidents by using the CHEMINFO and MSDSs available from the databases of 
CCOHS (Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety). Table 3.2 shows an 
extract of the data used in our analysis. The table shows the NFPA Health (H), Fire (F) 
and Reactivity (R) ratings of the two main chemicals involved in each incident as well 
as those of the most hazardous of the two. The “most hazardous” columns for H, F, 
and R were established by choosing the maximum rating for each category of H, F, and 
R among two main chemicals. The “most hazardous of all” column was formed by 
taking the maximum rating among the “most hazardous” columns of H, F, and R.  
CAVEAT: The data contained incomplete and sometimes inaccurate incident 
information – for example, on numbers of injuries and community impact. 
Descriptions of incidents and causal information were sometimes vague and 
incomplete. Further, the incident data has been acknowledged as representing only a 
sampling of recent reactive incident data (US CSB 2002) and not a complete set. 
Therefore any statistical conclusion drawn from this limited data set can be deemed to 
be correct only for this sample and not guaranteed to be generalizeable. However, even 
this limited dataset can reveal some interesting, nonobvious observations. 
3.3.2 Hypothesis testing 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the NFPA ratings form the backbone of most 
Inherent Safety metrics in use today. The underlying precept is that materials with 
larger NFPA ratings translate to more hazardous processes. Given the interplay 
between hazard and risk, it is natural to expect that more accidents and incidents would 
involve more hazardous chemicals. “The index actually gives a measure of Inherent 
danger. The opposite of inherent danger is safety therefore lower values indicate a 
more inherently safer route” (Lawrence, 1996). Hence, with lower NFPA ratings, the 
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Hypotheses about the relationship of NFPA ratings and the incidents and their 
consequences are tested through one-sided Student’s t-test for one sample (Ross, 
2004). The variance σ2 of the population (all reactive incidents) is unknown, and 
hence, it seems reasonable to estimate it by the sample variance S2.  
indices will show that the route is inherently safer. The database was first used to 
validate this basic hypothesis of Inherent Safety metrics. 
H0 is rejected if the observed statistic T < -tα,n-1 and H0 is not rejected if T ≥ -
tα,n-1, where n is the number of samples (in this case, n is the number of incidents). α is 
usually chosen 0.05, but tests are also conducted for the case when α=0.01. tp,v is the 
pth quantile of the Student’s t distribution with v degrees of freedom. 
The observed test statistic T is then compared with -tα,n-1 to decide whether to 
reject the null hypothesis H0, which is tested against the alternative hypothesis HA with 
the level of significance α. 
 
The statistic T is defined by 
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Table 3.2: Data used for t-tests 
Chemical 1 Chemical 2 Most hazardous Incident 
Number 
Chemical(s) 
Name             H F R Name H F R H F R of all
159 Nitrogen trichloride 
Nitrogen 
trichloride UD





























oxide 2         4 3 
Phosphorous 














UD*          UD* UD* NA* NA* NA* NA* UD* UD* UD* UD* 
166 Steam and catalyst NI
*           NI* NI* NI* NI* NI* NI* NI* NI* NI* NI* NI* 
167            Ethylene oxide Ethylene oxide 2 4 3 NA
* NA* NA* NA* 2 4 3 4
* NI: Not enough Information, NA: Not Applicable, UD: Undetermined
 3.3.3 Hypothesis Class 1 – Influence of Chemical ratings on occurrence of 
incidents  
Null hypothesis H0: Incidents happened involved chemicals that had NFPA 
rating µ0≥ 3. 
where µ0 is the mean of the respective NFPA rating of all the incidents tested.  
Alternative hypothesis HA: Incidents happened involved chemicals that had 
NFPA rating µ0< 3. 
3.3.4 Hypothesis Class 2 – Influence of Chemical ratings on incidents’ 
consequences 
Null hypothesis H0: Incidents that had A involved chemicals that had NFPA 
rating µ0≥ 3. 
Alternative hypothesis HA: Incidents that had A involved chemicals that had 
NFPA rating µ0< 3. 
Four different consequences are evaluated 
- For consequences on fatality: A is the phrase “fatality ≥ 1”. 
- For consequences on injury: A is the phrase “injury”. 
- For consequences on property damage: A is the phrase “property 
damage”. 
- For consequences on the public: A is the phrase “public impact”. 
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 3.3.5 Results and discussion 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the t-tests on the relationship between the 
incidents and NFPA ratings. In case α = 0.05 & 0.01 and µ0=3, H0 is rejected for all the 
cases, except for the worst rating of all three ratings of two main chemicals. However, 
we will only focus on the cases when µ0=3 because NFPA ratings are considered high 
only when their values are ≥ 3.  
Tables 3.4 – 3.7 show the results of t-tests on the relationship between the 
incidents’ consequences – fatality, injury, property damage and public impact 
respectively and NFPA ratings.  These tables also show that whenever µ0=3, H0 is only 
not rejected in the case of worst rating of all chemicals in the incidents. 
From Table 3.3, it is shown that the null hypothesis “Incidents happened 
involved chemicals that had NFPA Chemical reactivity rating µ0≥ 3” is rejected. This 
means that chemicals with reactivity rating ≥ 3 are not necessarily more common in 
reactive incidents. Thus, there must be some other reasons for the accidents that are 
related to other factors such as process conditions, human errors, etc. In fact, the NFPA 
Reactivity rating was not intended to be used to measure reactivity, but rather to 
measure the “inherent” instability of a pure substance or product under conditions 
expected for product storage. It does not measure the tendency of a substance or 
compound to react with other substances or any process-specific factors (US CSB, 
2002). Thus it is easy to understand why H0 is rejected. 
This result indicates that the industry shouldn’t pay less attention to the 
chemicals with low NFPA ratings. Chemicals with low ratings do not indicate lesser 
propensity to accidents. In fact, nearly 90% of the incidents involved these low rated 
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 chemicals. One reason might be that low ratings might lull people to neglect essential 
safety measures thus inducing accidents. 
Also from Table 3.3, if we consider the most severe rating of all the chemicals 
in the incidents, then H0 cannot be rejected even when µ0=3. But this is not an 
appropriate approach as the most affected rating will certainly depend on the dominant 
chemical. However, from the CSB’s report, we don’t know the amount of each 
chemical in the incidents, and thus we cannot know which chemical is the dominant 
one in each incident. Only when we have enough information on the amount of each 
chemical used, then we can make use of this to test H0 considering the maximum 
potential risk. However, even when H0 cannot be rejected, according to hypothesis test 
theory, it doesn’t really mean that H0 is true. In that case, it just simply means that the 
sample evidence is insufficient to lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis H0. 
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 Table 3.3: Analysis results on the relationship between the incident occurrence and NFPA ratings 
Chemical 1 Chemical 2 Most hazardous 
  H           F R H F R H F R of all
Mean 2.29          1.38 1.29 1.78 0.75 0.77 2.55 1.57 1.54 3.07
Variance 
(s^2) 1.133060 1.872750 1.380821        1.64 1.66 0.96 0.90 2.03 1.26 0.52
n 133          133 134 88 88 88 137 137 137 137
T -7.6573 -13.6864 -16.8350        -8.9000 -16.3776 -21.3329 -5.5940 -11.7634 -15.1928 1.1802
α,n-1 0.05,132 0.05,132 0.05,133        0.05,87 0.05,87 0.05,87 0.05,138 0.05,138 0.05,138 0.05,138
-t(α,n-1) -1.6568 -1.6568         -1.6568 -1.6629 -1.6629 -1.6629 -1.6565 -1.6565 -1.6565 -1.6565
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
T -2.2402 -9.4727         -11.9095 -5.2402 -12.9209 -16.5439 0.5865 -7.6522 -9.9893 9.2646
µo = 2.5 
Reject Ho Yes        Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
T 3.177          -5.5291 -6.984 -1.5804 -9.2469 -11.7548 6.767 -3.541 -4.7857 17.3489
α=0.05 
µo = 2 
Reject Ho No Yes      Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
-t(α,n-1) -2.3554 -2.3554         -2.3554 -2.3704 -2.3704 -2.3704 -2.3545 -2.3545 -2.3545 -2.3545
T -7.6573 -13.6864 -16.8350        -8.9000 -16.3776 -21.3329 -5.5940 -11.7634 -15.1928 1.1802
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
α=0.01 µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
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 Table 3.4: Analysis results on the relationship between the incidents’ fatality and NFPA ratings 
Chemical 1 Chemical 2 Most hazardous 
  H           F R H F R H F R of all
Mean 2.00          1.70 1.68 1.61 0.96 0.70 2.20 1.93 1.85 3.15
Variance 
(s^2) 1.0256          1.9590 1.9220 1.6126 2.0435 0.8577 1.0110 2.0195 1.7280 0.5780
n 40          40 41 23 23 23 41 41 41 41
T -6.2450          -5.8743 -6.0832 -5.2543 -6.8557 -11.9328 -5.1257 -4.8355 -5.5838 1.2325
α,n-1 0.05,39          0.05,39 0.05,40 0.05,22 0.05,22 0.05,22 0.05,40 0.05,40 0.05,40 0.05,40
-t(α,n-1) -1.6853          -1.6853 -1.6842 -1.7175 -1.7175 -1.7175 -1.6842 -1.6842 -1.6842 -1.6842
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
T -3.1225          -3.6150 -3.7738 -3.3660 -5.1782 -9.3436 -1.9415 -2.5826 -3.1483 5.4434
µo = 2.5 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
T 0.0000          -1.3556 -1.4645 -1.4778 -3.5008 -6.7544 1.2426 -0.3297 -0.7128 9.6544
α=0.05
µo = 2 
Reject Ho No          No No No Yes Yes No No No No
-t(α,n-1) -2.4263          -2.4263 -2.4237 -2.5088 -2.5088 -2.5088 -2.4237 -2.4237 -2.4237 -2.4237
T -6.2450          -5.8743 -6.0832 -5.2543 -6.8557 -11.9328 -5.1257 -4.8355 -5.5838 1.2325
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
α=0.01 µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
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 Table 3.5: Analysis results on the relationship between the incidents’ injury and NFPA ratings 
Chemical 1 Chemical 2 Most hazardous 
  H           F R H F R H F R of all
Mean 2.39          1.24 1.27 1.80 0.70 0.86 2.60 1.44 1.58 3.07
Variance 
(s^2) 0.9555          1.7570 1.4516 1.5171 1.5678 1.0081 0.7216 1.9883 1.2853 0.4251
n 99          99 100 69 69 69 101 101 101 101
T -6.1691          -13.1932 -14.3589 -8.1125 -15.2873 -17.7454 -4.6855 -11.1495 -12.5506 1.0682
α,n-1 0.05,98          0.05,98 0.05,99 0.05,68 0.05,68 0.05,68 0.05,100 0.05,100 0.05,100 0.05,100
-t(α,n-1) -1.6609          -1.6609 -1.6608 -1.6679 -1.6679 -1.6679 -1.6606 -1.6606 -1.6606 -1.6606
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
T -1.0796          -9.4400 -10.2089 -4.7404 -11.9702 -13.6088 1.2299 -7.5859 -8.1184 8.7748
µo = 2.5 
Reject Ho No Yes       Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
T 4.0099          -5.6867 -6.0589 -1.3684 -8.6532 -9.4722 7.1454 -4.0223 -3.6862 16.4813
α=0.05 
µo = 2 
Reject Ho No Yes      Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
-t(α,n-1) -2.3655          -2.3655 -2.3651 -2.3829 -2.3829 -2.3829 -2.3648 -2.3648 -2.3648 -2.3648
T -6.1691          -13.1932 -14.3589 -8.1125 -15.2873 -17.7454 -4.6855 -11.1495 -12.5506 1.0682
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
α=0.01 µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
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 Table 3.6: Analysis results on the relationship between the incidents’ property damage and NFPA ratings 
Chemical 1 Chemical 2 Most hazardous 
  H           F R H F R H F R of all
Mean 2.16         1.70 1.63 1.55 0.96 0.84 2.39 1.89 1.82 3.14 
Variance 
(s^2) 1.1721         1.9923 1.5295 1.6925 1.8784 1.1349 1.0499 2.0720 1.3852 0.5989 
n 82         82 83 51 51 51 85 85 85 85 
T -7.0382         -8.3714 -10.1178 -7.9648 -10.6255 -14.4587 -5.5046 -7.0831 -9.2160 1.6819 
α,n-1 0.05,81         0.05,81 0.05,82 0.05,50 0.05,50 0.05,50 0.05,84 0.05,84 0.05,84 0.05,84 
-t(α,n-1) -1.6643         -1.6643 -1.6638 -1.6763 -1.6763 -1.6763 -1.6636 -1.6636 -1.6636 -1.6636 
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
T -2.8561         -5.1637 -6.4346 -5.2202 -8.0202 -11.1069 -1.0057 -3.8806 -5.2992 7.6387 µo = 2.5 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
T 1.3260         -1.9559 -2.7513 -2.4756 -5.4149 -7.7551 3.4933 -0.6782 -1.3824 13.5954 
α=0.05 
µo = 2 
Reject Ho No Yes        Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
-t(α,n-1) -2.3737         -2.3737 -2.3732 -2.4038 -2.4038 -2.4038 -2.372 -2.372 -2.372 -2.372 
T -7.0382         -8.3714 -10.1178 -7.9648 -10.6255 -14.4587 -5.5046 -7.0831 -9.2160 1.6819 
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
α=0.01 µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
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Table 3.7: Analysis results on the relationship between the incidents’ public impact and NFPA ratings 
Chemical 1 Chemical 2 Most hazardous 
  H           F R H F R H F R of all
Mean 2.34          1.79 1.38 1.43 1.52 0.39 2.49 2.08 1.51 3.18
Variance 
(s^2) 1.0420          1.9004 1.8219 1.5296 3.0791 0.5217 0.9406 2.2834 1.6775 0.6248
n 38          38 39 23 23 23 39 39 39 39
T -3.9730          -5.4130 -7.4740 -6.0694 -4.0402 -17.3205 -3.3021 -3.8149 -7.1708 1.4180
α,n-1 0.05,37          0.05,37 0.05,38 0.05,22 0.05,22 0.05,22 0.05,38 0.05,38 0.05,38 0.05,38
-t(α,n-1) -1.6875          -1.6875 -1.6863 -1.7175 -1.7175 -1.7175 -1.6863 -1.6863 -1.6863 -1.6863
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
T -0.9535          -3.1772 -5.1606 -4.1305 -2.6737 -14.0007 -0.0826 -1.7485 -4.7599 5.3682µo = 2.5 
Reject Ho No Yes       Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
T 2.0660          -0.9414 -2.8472 -2.1917 -1.3071 -10.6810 3.1370 0.3179 -2.3491 9.3185
Choose 
α=0.05 
µo = 2 
Reject Ho No        No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
-t(α,n-1) -2.4319          -2.4319 -2.4291 -2.5088 -2.5088 -2.5088 -2.4291 -2.4291 -2.4291 -2.4291
T -3.9730          -5.4130 -7.4740 -6.0694 -4.0402 -17.3205 -3.3021 -3.8149 -7.1708 1.4180
T<-t(α,n-1) Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Choose 
α=0.01 µo = 3 
Reject Ho Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
 The above analysis indicates that the NFPA chemical reactivity rating may not 
be a sufficient approach for assessing reactivity. In fact, as discussed in Kossoy et al. 
(2005), the attempts to use a single indicator of reactivity can cause unsafe results 
because: 
- Any of the parameters applied is based, implicitly or explicitly, on some 
assumptions regarding the conditions under which a reaction proceeds. 
Insufficient attention to the parameter-related conditions is one of the 
typical reasons for mistakes. 
- There is no way to find any single universal parameter that would allow 
general characterization of reactivity of a substance or reactive mixture. 
One has to choose a certain (limited) set of parameters that would shed light 
upon different cases when potential reactivity hazards come about. 
- Methods that are usually applied for reactivity rating often turn out to be 
too simple to reveal real potential hazards of a compound. 
Kossoy et al. (2005) proposed another approach of using an indicator or set of 
indicators of reactive hazard that would give at least some preliminary and rapid 
estimates. This seems to be a reasonable initial step for a quick assessment of reactive 
hazards. 
Crowl and Elwell (2004) also tried to use 13 sets of calorimeter data to evaluate 
a number of common criteria to characterize chemical reactive hazards but concluded 
that “no single criterion is likely to be adequate for screening all classes of reactive 
chemicals”.  
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 Ideally, the general approach to such problems should involve performing a 
comprehensive analysis/ evaluation of process hazards. Hazard evaluation studies 
provide the basis for answering such fundamental questions as: 
- Can a thermal runaway occur? 
- If so, under what process conditions or deviations? 
- How severe would the consequences be? 
- Are existing safeguards adequate to control or mitigate the hazard? 
Results of these studies are used by Process Hazard Analysis study team to 
evaluate the proper level of hazard controls (Joseph et al., 2003). However, such an 
analysis is usually difficult and time-consuming.  
As discussed earlier, reactivity is not necessarily an intrinsic property of a 
chemical substance. The hazards associated with reactivity are related to process-
specific factors, such as operating temperatures, pressures, quantities handled, 
concentrations, the presence of other substances, and impurities with catalytic effects 
(US CSB, 2002). Hence, risk in a process would map to human injury, environmental 
damage, or economic loss observed in the database in terms of both the incident 
likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury. Risk would be related to the 
inherent reactivity (primary prevention), and also to the secondary prevention layer 
(passive, active and procedural) as mentioned above and is therefore a more 
appropriate measurement. Even when the chemical is “inherently safe”, if the layers of 
protection are strong enough, the risk will be high and accidents happen. 
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 Table 3.3 also shows that, for tests with NFPA ratings of Health and Fire and 
when µ0=3, H0 is also rejected for all cases. This result again shows that NFPA 
Chemical ratings of Health, Fire and Reactivity do not predict very well the occurrence 
of incidents. When we change µ0 to 2.5 and α = 0.05, H0 is not rejected in one more 
case: the worst Health rating of two chemicals. When µ0=2 and α = 0.05, H0 is not 
rejected in two more cases: the Health ratings of each chemical. 
Similarly, results of the tests with the incidents’ consequences (Tables 3.4 – 
3.7) again show that there might be no relationship between the NFPA higher ratings 
and the consequences. All the tests show that the null hypothesis “Incidents with 
higher impact were involved with chemicals that had NFPA rating µ0≥ 3” is rejected in 
all cases (except the worst rating case). This means those chemicals with NFPA ratings 
of Health, Fire or Reactivity ≥ 3 are not common in the incidents with higher fatality, 
injury, property damage and public impact. Hence, the NFPA chemical ratings also do 
not predict very well the incidents’ consequences.  
In summary, NFPA Hazard ratings are insufficient as the sole basis for 
predicting accidents because they consider only one facet of chemical properties. To 
prevent incidents, consideration of other factors of the process such as operating 
temperature, pressures, quantities handled, concentrations, the presence of other 
substances, and impurities with catalytic effects must be employed. 
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 Chapter 4 
A MULTIVARIATE APPROACH TO ASSESSING PROCESS 
ROUTES 
 
 There have been many methods proposed to assess process routes. One 
common approach is to use index to score each route. As reviewed in Chapter 2, 
previous indices have many limitations such as subjective scaling, subjective 
weighting, limited coverage, and unknown granularity, etc. These shortcomings are the 
motivation for this study of a new multivariate approach.  
It is clear from the above study in Chapter 3 that simple metrics have limited 
applicability in assessing process routes. What is required are approaches that can 
consider a variety of features of each route and be able to compare and contrast the 
various routes along multiple dimensions. This will help answer the following 
questions 
(a) What is the most “inherently safer” process route among the routes 
examined? 
(b)  What are the similarities and differences between the available routes 
examined? 
 The methodology presented here uses PCA method to analyze the various 
Safety, Health and Environmental aspects of each process route. Information on these 
aspects of each route will be reflected through various material, reaction and process 
properties.  
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 4.1 Parameters 
We consider fifteen factors, viz: Toxicity, Reactivity, Explosiveness, 
Flammability, Heat of Reaction, Pressure, Process Yield, Temperature, Acidification 
Potential, Global Warming Potential, Ozone Depletion Potential, Photochemical 
Oxidation Potential, Human Toxicity Potential by Ingestion and Terrestrial Toxicity 
Potential, Human Toxicity Potential by inhalation or dermal Exposure, and Aquatic 
Toxicity Potential. These factors are treated as different parameters that reflect all 
aspects of a route. Each parameter is a column in the dataset. The reactions in each 
route make the rows of the matrix. The dataset can be expanded easily by just adding 
more columns; this gives the methodology its “extendibility”. Table 4.1 provides 
typical ranges of these parameters. We will analyze the parameters in the dataset using 
PCA and find out what are the parameters responsible for the trends in the dataset.  
4.1.1 Safety aspects 
To assess the Chemical safety aspects of the routes, we have chosen three 
parameters: Reactivity, Explosiveness, and Flammability.  
It is likely that the more reactive a chemical is, the more unstable it is. This 
can cause some unwanted reactions to happen. Unwanted reactions can originate 
hazards for a process. Hence, reactivity is chosen here as a chemical safety aspect 
to be analyzed. 
Explosiveness means the tendency of chemicals to form an explosive 
mixture in the air. The explosive nature of chemicals is represented by the 
difference between the Lower Explosiveness Limit (LEL) and the Upper 
Explosive Limit (UEL) of each chemical. The wider the range between  explosion   
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Table 4.1: Factors considered and their normalization 
No. Parameter Typical Value 
Original 
Range 
Normalization method Note(s) 
1 Toxicity (T) [0,4] [0,4] 
~ TT
4
=   
2 Reactivity (R) [0,4] [0,4] 
~ RR
4
=   
3 Explosiveness E (%) [0,100] [0,100] 
~ EE
100







=   





1 a * H
∆ = − + ∆  
a = 4.47E-05  







a(P 1)P 1 e− −= −  
P<1atm: 
~
a(P 1)P 1 e −= −  
a = 0.03 















(aT b)T 1 e− −= −  
T<25ºC: 
~
(aT b)T 1 e −= −  
a = 0.005, b = 0.125 
a = 0.02, b = 0.5 
9 HTPI & TTP (mg/kg) [300,4000] 
10 HTPE (mg/m3) [10,70] 









= −   
12 GWP [1,300] 
13 ODP - 
14 PCOP [0.1,1] 













- Data not available
 limits, the greater the probability that the formed vapour cloud is in the flammable 
region. 
Explosiveness = UEL – LEL 
Flammability means the ease with which a material burns in the air (King, 
1990). Accidental fires and explosions of flammable mixtures with the air are often 
followed by the escape of combustible materials into process equipment. The 
flammability of chemicals is of great concern in the process industries, and so it is used 
here.  
Reactivity and Flammability ratings of each chemical are taken from NFPA 
Reactivity and Fire ratings respectively. These NFPA ratings have values ranging from 
0 to 4: 
• 0: the chemical has minimum impact on the respective category. 
• 1: slight impact. 
• 2: moderate impact. 
• 3: high/serious impact. 
• 4: extreme/severe impact. 
NFPA ratings as well as the UEL and LEL of each chemical can be easily 
found in the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) of that chemical provided by the 
chemical’s suppliers. The Reactivity, Explosiveness and Flammability ratings for each 
reaction in each route will be the maximum respective impact rating of all the 
chemicals in the reaction for the maximum possible risk. 
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 For process safety aspects, four parameters are considered, viz: Heat of 
Reaction, Pressure, Process Yield, and Temperature. 
• Reactions in which the heat of reactions change a lot, e.g. large quantity of 
heat is released or absorbed, are potentially hazardous. 
• Any operation under a high pressure or subatmospheric pressure is 
generally hazardous. A high pressure can cause the leakage of chemicals. 
The difference of the reaction’s pressure range from atmospheric pressure 
is chosen to represent for the pressure factor of the reaction. 
• The yield of a reaction indicates how much inventory is needed to meet the 
required production rate. A low conversion and hence a low yield will 
usually mean that a recycle stream is needed, and this will necessitate 
increased inventory in the reaction step. Therefore, a high yield should be 
viewed as contributing to inherent safety. 
• Temperature is a direct measure of the heat energy available for release, 
hence it is also an important parameter to be considered. A reaction with 
high or low temperature compared to ambient is inherently unsafe. The 
Temperature factor of each reaction is thus the difference of the operating 
Temperature from ambient - 25°C. 
4.1.2 Health and Environmental aspects 
Toxicity is a property of the substance that destroys life or injures health when 
introduced into or absorbed by a living organism (Marshall, 1987; Wells, 1980). The 
Health aspect of each reaction is represented by its Toxicity level, which is chosen as 
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 the maximum Toxicity level of all the chemicals in the reaction. Toxicity rating for 
each chemical is taken from the NFPA Health rating of that chemical. 
As introduced in Chapter 2, the whole WAR algorithm isn’t used in this work 
as there is not enough information in the route selection stage. Only the Potential 
Environmental Impact (PEI) factors developed by Mallick (Cabezas et al., 1999) for 
the use of the WAR algorithm are utilized in this work. Eight potential environmental 
and health impact are considered here.  
• Acidification potential (AP) is determined by comparing the rate of release 
of H+ in the atmosphere as promoted by a chemical to the rate of release of 
H+ in the atmosphere as promoted by SO2. This relative amount is used as 
the score of a given chemical for AP impact. 
• Global warming potential (GWP) is determined by comparing the amount 
of infrared radiation a unit mass of a chemical can absorb in 100 years as 
compared to the amount of infrared radiation a unit mass of carbon dioxide 
can absorb over the same time span.  This takes into account the decay of 
the chemicals in the atmosphere over this time span as well. 
• Ozone depletion potential (ODP) is determined by comparing the rate at 
which a unit mass of chemical reacts with ozone to form molecular oxygen 
to the rate at which a unit mass of CFC-11 (trichlorofluoromethane) reacts 
with ozone to form molecular oxygen.  In general, for a chemical to have 
ODP it must contain a chlorine or bromine atom.  These amounts take into 
account the decomposition of the chemicals in the atmosphere. 
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 • Photochemical oxidation potential (PCOP) is determined by comparing the 
rate at which a unit mass of chemical reacts with a hydroxyl radical (OH-) 
to the rate at which a unit mass of ethylene reacts with OH-.  These values 
have been determined for many low and medium molecular weight 
hydrocarbons. 
• Human toxicity potential by ingestion (HTPI) is approximated by the value 
of the lethal-dose through ingestion that would kill 50% of a sample 
population of rats when administered orally, LD50.  This is a popular 
indicator for evaluating toxicity of chemicals.  The LD50s are generally 
reported in units of mg of chemical/kg rat.  In this system, a higher LD50 
value represents a less toxic chemical. 
• Terrestrial toxicity potential (TTP) is determined by using toxicological 
data from one terrestrial species, rat.  This species was chosen because of 
its acceptance as an indicative terrestrial species and its prevalence of data.  
The data comes in the form of a lethal dose which kills 50% of the 
specimens by oral ingestion, oral LD50.  This is the same value that is used 
to estimate Human Toxicity Potential by Ingestion. 
• Human toxicity potential by inhalation or dermal exposure (HTPE) is 
approximated by using 8-hour threshold limit values (TLV) as 
recommended by OSHA, ACGIH, or NIOSH.  This was considered to be 
an adequate measuring stick for comparison of chemicals that would pose a 
threat to human health through inhalation and dermal exposure routes.  
These agencies have evaluated the chemicals of significant concern.  
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 • Aquatic toxicity potential (ATP) is estimated by using toxicological data 
for a single, representative species of fish, Pimephales promelas (fathead 
minnows).  This species was chosen again because of its acceptance as a 
universal aquatic indicator and it prevalence of data.  The data for this assay 
comes in the form of a LC50, a lethal concentration which causes death in 
50% of the test specimens. The LC50s are generally reported in units of 
mg/L. 
Like toxicity, the above properties are typically applicable to chemicals. To 
extend this to a reaction, the maximum values of AP, GWP, ODP, and PCOP will be 
chosen for each reaction in a route. However, for HTPI & TTP, HTPE and ATP, we 
will choose the minimum values to account for the maximum risk in each reaction. The 
values of these potential environmental impact are obtained from the WAR software 
(US EPA, 2002).  
In our system, we have fifteen parameters which do not share the same unit. If 
the values are applied as such, it would lead to an implicit scaling effect. For example, 
numerically, a variation in temperature between 1000 and 1100°C is much greater than 
a variation in Reactivity between 1 and 2. However, the effect of each of these 
parameters on the overall SHE characteristics and the process may be similar and the 
information content of the temperature is not inherently greater. Hence, it is important 
to scale the factors suitably.  
4.1.3 An objective approach to scaling SHE parameters 
We differentiate between two types of parameters, including ordinal and 
interval-ratio parameters. The former measures the relative values while the latter 
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 measures the absolute values. In our approach, we scale the parameters to the range of 
0 and 1, with “0” means no hazardous and “1” means the most hazardous level.  
• Toxicity, Reactivity and Flammability: these parameters are divided by 4 
because their values range from 0 to 4. 
~ XX
4
=  (4.1) 
• Explosiveness is scaled to 0-1 range by being divided by 100 (the 




=  (4.2) 
• Yield (Y) values are from 0 to 100. However, the smaller yield is the more 




−=  (4.3) 
The second type of parameters has to be converted to the first type of parameters 
before they can be incorporated into an index. This normalization can be performed in 
many ways. The method proposed here is based on the precept that risk in operation 
conditions and physical phenomena that have been previously dealt with by the 
chemical industry can be managed easily. For example, Heat of Reaction (∆HR), 
Pressure (P) and Temperature (T) are to be scaled to the range of 0 and 1. A frequency 
distribution of these parameters for common reactions will be used to scale them. The 
frequency tables are based on a database of 89 reaction processes in many industries 
(Thomas and Farago, 1973; Shreve, 1984; and Ullmann, 2004). Details of some of the 
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reactions in the database are provided in Table 4.2, and the complete list is available in 
the Appendix. Based on these, we can observe that heats of reaction value of most 





.  This correlation is shown in Figure 4.2. 

















We therefore propose a correlation between the ∆HR and its scaled values 
as:  





1 a * H
∆ = − + ∆  (4.4) 
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Table 4.2: Selected reaction processes 






1 Synthetic ethyl alcohol 
(purer and cheaper than 
from fermentation) 
C2H4 + H2O Æ C2H5OH    300 67.1 -43.4
2 Ethylene Glycol Ethylene oxide Æ Ethylene 
Glycol 
60   1 -





4      Carbon Disulfur CH4 + 4S Æ CS2 + 2H2S 700 2.7 -
5    Acetylene CaC2 + 2H2O Æ Ca(OH)2 + 
C2H2 
150 2 -126
6 Acetylene from Methane 2CH4 Æ C2H2 + 3H2 1500   - +405
7    Ammonia ½ N2 + 3/2 H2 Æ NH3 100 98.7 -51.28
8 Vinylacetylene (to make 
Chloroprene) 
2C2H2 Æ CH2=CH_C≡CH3 18-24  0.35 - 
9  Fuel Cells reaction H2(g) + ½ O2(g) Æ H2O (l) 25 1 -286 
10 Industrial gas CH4 + ½ O2 Æ CO2 + 2H2O 
CH4 + CO2 Æ 2CO + 2H2 
CH4 + H2O Æ CO + 3H2 











Methane from industrial gas CO + 3H2 Æ CH4 + H2O 







13 Benzene   C6H12 Æ C6H6 + 3H2 300-450 9.9-29.6 206.2
 - Data not available 
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Figure 4.2: Scaling from ∆HR to  
~
RH∆
Pressure is also scaled using the same method. For Pressures > 1 atm, details 
are provided in Figures 4.3 and 4.4a. The correlation of Pressure and its Scaled values 
is the following 
~
a(P 1)P 1 e− −= −  (4.5) 
where a = 0.03. 
For Pressure < 1 atm, the correlation is as follows 
~
a(P 1)P 1 e −= −  (4.6) 
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The scaling of Temperature > 25ºC is provided in Figures 4.5 and 4.6a. The 
correlation of Temperature and its scaled values is 
~
(aT b)T 1 e− −= −  (4.7) 
where a = 0.005, and b = 0.125. 
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 For Temperatures < 25ºC, the correlation is shown in Figure 4.6b 
~
(aT b)T 1 e −= −  (4.8) 






























































Figure 4.6b: Scaling from T to  for T < 25ºC 
~
T
Similar trends for Potential Environmental Impact parameters are unknown. 
However, we have a large database of PEI values of about 1,710 chemicals. Hence, we 
can make use of Chebyshev’s theorem (Levin et al., 1994) to scale these environmental 
impact parameters. The theorem says that no matter what the shape of the distribution, 
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 at least 75% of the values will fall within ± 2 standard deviations from the mean of the 
distribution. In this special case where the values happen to follow a normal 
distribution, then the value range extends to about 95% of the samples. Hence, if we 
scale our Potential Environmental Impact parameters using the following, we are 




k lψ  will be between 0 and 

















k lψ  is the scaled specific potential environment impact of chemical k for 
an impact of type l.  
  is the relative score of chemical k on some arbitrary scale within 
impact category l.  
,( )k lScore
  is the arithmetic average of the score of all chemicals k 
within impact category l. 
( )k lScore< >
 lσ  is the standard deviation of all the chemical scores in impact category l. 
Based on the database in the WAR GUI software, we have calculated the 
 and the ( )k lScore< > lσ  of each impact category. These values are shown in Table 4.3. 










k lψ , the safer the chemical. 
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HTPI & TTP 3270 4812 
HTPE 322 1020 
ATP 14704 261575 
GWP 3061 3386 
ODP 2.4 4.4 





In our case studies, all of the values after being scaled are between 0 and 1 
(except the AP value of ACH route in MMA Manufacturing which is 1.003, however 
this value is not used in the PCA as there is not enough information about AP for the 
routes). Hence, this scaling method is good for our purpose. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of all factors used and their transformations. 
After scaling all the parameters to the range from 0 to 1, we can add them together into 
a cumulative index of each route. The larger the index, the less benign the route. The 
cumulative index for some common chemical manufacturing routes is reported in 
Chapter 5. This approach overcomes some of the drawbacks of the indices reviewed in 
Chapter 2, namely subjective scaling of different factors, subjective weighting between 
them, and limited coverage of effects (safety, health, or environmental). But it suffers 
from the fact that a univariate index provides only a based differentiability between 
competing routes. This leads to problems such as the one exemplified below. For 
example, there are routes A and B with their respective cumulative index is 6.2 and 
6.3. In that case, can we conclude that route A is safer than route B as route A’s 
cumulative index is lower than that of route B? Further, if route A has the highest 
reaction temperature while route B has a much lower temperature than route A and 
other routes; and we have determined that temperature is the most essential factor 
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 differentiating all the routes. Using the cumulative index in this case cannot 
differentiate correctly among the routes. In other words, we cannot know if a route is 
different from other routes or not.  
In summary, the cumulative index abstracts essential information about the 
route and does not provide a way to detect the most important parameters/ factors and 
manage the risk. This need can be filled using multivariate statistical analysis, 
specifically using PCA, which attempts to capture the variances. Through PCA,  we 
will know if a route is significantly different from other routes or not, and which 
parameters account for the differences. 
4.2 A multivariate statistical approach to assessing Safety, Health, and 
Environmental aspects of process routes 
4.2.1 Multivariate modeling of process routes 
The objective is to differentiate and compare the routes and identify the one 
that is “inherently safer”. Each route, as mentioned above, can be considered to have 
fifteen factors that describe its various facets. We can model these routes into a data 
matrix X in which each row is a reaction step in a route, and each column is a factor. 
In order to analyze these data, we have to reduce their dimensions first. One of 
the most common forms of dimensionality reduction is Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA). PCA decomposes the data matrix X as the sum of the outer product of vectors 
ti and pi plus a residual matrix E. 
X = t1p1T + t2p2T + … + tkpkT + E (4.10) 
and Xpi = ti (4.11) 
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 The ti vectors are known as scores and pi vectors are known as loadings. The pi 
vectors are the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of X, i.e. for each pi 
Cov(X)pi = λipi (4.12) 
where λi is the eigenvalue associated with the eigenvector pi. The (ti,pi) pairs 
are arranged in descending order of λi. Each λi is a measure of the amount of variance/ 
information described by the (ti,pi) pair. Hence, t1 scores (t1=Xp1) makes the first PC 
which captures the largest amount of variation in the original dataset.  
The full set of PCs is as large as the original set of parameters. It is common 
that the first few PCs can explain over 80% of the variance of the original data. This 
applies to our dataset as well. So, we will use the first two PCs to create two-
dimensional plots that are easy to visualize. The PCs have the property that they are 
mutually orthogonal, i.e. they describe independent factors of the routes statistically. 
More details about PCA can be found in Joliffe (2002) or in many other textbooks as 
well as papers. 
We use the PCA as implemented in the PLS Toolbox for MATLAB by 
Eigenvector Research Inc. (2004). 
4.2.2 Visual inspection of PCA 
PCA can be visually depicted in two ways. Scores plot is the projection of the 
original matrix X onto the PCs. Each value on the scores plot corresponds to the 
sample. Hence, the scores plot contains information on how the samples are related to 
each other. Alternatively, on the loadings plot, each value corresponds to the original 
parameters; and the loadings plot contains information on the relations between the 
original parameters. 
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 The analysis of outliers in these plots can provide important insights. In our 
case, these outliers are the parameters, or routes which load the most significantly into 
the PCs. These can reveal parameters/ routes that are the most inherently unsafe. 
4.2.3 Ranking and comparing routes using the PCA 
The first PC is an orthogonal regression line that explains the greatest amount 
of variation in the data. It is thus the “line of best fit”. Its coefficients are always 
positive, indicating that it is a weighted average of all the parameters. The first PC 
therefore have some similarity to the Inherent Safety metrics reviewed in Chapter 2. 
By analyzing the scores and loadings on the first PC, we can rank the hazardous level 
of each reaction, and figure out the most extreme parameter among the routes. 
The second PC is perpendicular to the first PC, and often referred as the “line 
of worst fit”. It represents the differences or variability between the parameters and 
reactions. Hence, its coefficients can be positive or negative. Analyzing the loadings 
plot on the second PC will help us find the parameters which vary the most across all 
the routes, i. e. the factors that make the routes different. Hence, our multivariate 
approach allows routes to be ranked and be compared. The analysis also points out the 
most extreme effect of the route and enables better risk management targeted at 
specific hazard factors. This methodology is illustrated in the next chapter using three 
case studies. 
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 Chapter 5 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 The method described in Chapter 4 has been applied to three industrially 
important processes – Acetic Acid, Phenol and Methyl Methacrylate (MMA) 
manufacture. 
5.1 Acetic Acid manufacture 
There are ten routes for manufacturing Acetic Acid to be assessed in this case 
study. They are 
1. Methane Oxidation 
2. Halcon Vapor Phase Oxidation 
3. Acetaldehyde Oxidation 
4. Low Pressure Carbonylation 
5. Ethylene Oxidation 
6. Butane Oxidation 
7. Huls Butene Oxidation 
8. Ethane Oxidation 
9. Direct Ethanol Oxidation 
10. High Pressure Carbonylation 
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The reactions’ information of these routes is taken from Palaniappan (2001). 
Parameters for every route are shown in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 provides the scaled 
parameters for Acetic Acid Manufacturing routes. Since PCA is based on the variances 
in the dataset, it is not necessary to include in the dataset the columns (parameters) that 
do not vary among the routes. Hence, in this case study, we ignore HTPE and ATP. 
Also, as there is not enough information in literature for calculating GWP, ODP and 
AP, these are also not considered. 
As described in Chapter 4, the proposed method offers two different ways to 
compare routes. The first is the cumulative index and the second is through the scores 
plot. Both types of analysis have been performed here. The cumulative index value for 
each route is shown in Table 5.3. Ranking from the i-Safe index of Palaniappan et al. 
is also shown for comparison. Since i-Safe index considers only the safety factors and 
not the Health and Environmental impact ones, we report two sets of results – with and 
without these additional factors to show the effects of these factors on the ranking 
results.  
The results of the analysis for the Acetic Acid Manufacturing routes are shown 
in Figures 5.1 – 5.4. There are 10 and 8 PCs calculated in the case of with and without 
the environmental impact respectively. We choose the first two PCs as they 
cumulatively account for 93.87% and 94.09% of the variance in the original dataset 
respectively. 
Without the environmental impact, from Figure 5.1 we can see that Direct 
Ethanol Oxidation has the smallest score on the first PC, hence it is the most inherently 
safer route. Methane Oxidation is the most hazardous route as its score is the biggest 
on PC 1. Table 5.3 shows that there is almost no difference among Palaniappan’s,





















TTP HTPE ATP GWP ODP PCOP AP 
Methane oxidation-1 2 0 61.5 4 -738.37 100 99 500 5628 55 15.0 11 - 0.123 - 
Methane oxidation-2 2 1 61.5 4 -92.00 1.5  99 300 3310 25 15.0 - - 0.123 -
Halcon vapor phase oxidation 2 2 30.1 4 -382.76 20 60 250 3310 25 58.7 - - 1.000 - 
Acetaldehyde oxidation 2 2 56.0 4 -271.91 10  95 80 661 25 34.0 - - 0.527 -
Low pressure carbonylation 2 1 61.5 4 -92.00 15 99 200 3310 25 15.0 - - 0.123 - 
Ethylene oxidation 2 2 30.1 4 -382.76 4.5  80 150 3310 25 58.7 - - 1.000 -
Butane oxidation 2 1 10.6 4 -491.51 56 75 200 1227 25 11.7 - - 0.410 - 
Huls butene oxidation 3 1 39.0 4 -264.22 30  75 275 1100 9 41.0 - - 0.643 -
Ethane oxidation 2 1 10.6 4 -589.03 31 25 400 3310 25 84.0 - - 0.082 - 
Direct ethanol oxidation 2 1 15.7 3 -455.96 3.4  90 115 3310 25 84.0 - - 0.268 -
High pressure carbonylation 2 1 61.5 4 -92.00 650 99 250 3310 25 15.0 - - 0.123 - 
       - Data not available 
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rature HTPI & TTP HTPE ATP GWP ODP PCOP AP 
Methane oxidation-1 0.5 0 0.615 1 0.96 0.95 0.01 0.907 0.564 0.977 1.000 0.001 - 0.111 - 
Methane oxidation-2 0.5 0.25 0.615 1 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.747 0.743 0.989 1.000 - - 0.111  -
Halcon vapor phase oxidation 0.5 0.5 0.301 1 0.87 0.43 0.40 0.675 0.743 0.989 1.000 - - 0.903  -
Acetaldehyde oxidation 0.5 0.5 0.560 1 0.77 0.24 0.05 0.240 0.949 0.989 1.000 - - 0.476  -
Low pressure carbonylation 0.5 0.25 0.615 1 0.27 0.34 0.01 0.583 0.743 0.989 1.000 - - 0.111  -
Ethylene oxidation 0.5 0.5 0.301 1 0.87 0.10 0.20 0.465 0.743 0.989 1.000 - - 0.903  -
Butane oxidation 0.5 0.25 0.106 1 0.92 0.81 0.25 0.583 0.905 0.989 1.000 - - 0.370  -
Huls butene oxidation 0.75 0.25 0.390 1 0.76 0.58 0.25 0.713 0.915 0.996 1.000 - - 0.581  -
Ethane oxidation 0.5 0.25 0.106 1 0.94 0.59 0.75 0.847 0.743 0.989 1.000 - - 0.074  -
Direct ethanol oxidation 0.5 0.25 0.157 0.75 0.90 0.07 0.10 0.362 0.743 0.989 1.000 - - 0.242  -
High pressure carbonylation 0.5 0.25 0.615 1 0.27 1.00 0.01 0.675 0.743 0.989 1.000 - - 0.111  -
  - Data not available 
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Table 5.3: Rankings of Acetic Acid routes using different methods 
Cumulative Index values Without Environmental Impact With Environmental Impact 
Routes 
Without Env. Impact With Env. Impact Palaniappan’s Cumulative Index Our method
Cumulative 
Index Our method 
Methane oxidation-1      4.9 5.6 10 11 6 9
Methane oxidation-2       3.4 4.3
10 
2 2 2 2
Halcon vapor phase oxidation 4.7 6.3 5 8 8 11 10 
Acetaldehyde oxidation 3.9       5.3 4 4 4 5 5
Low pressure carbonylation 3.6 4.4 3 3 3 3 3 
Ethylene oxidation 3.9       5.6 2 5 5 7 6
Butane oxidation        4.4 5.7 6 7 7 8 8
Huls butene oxidation 4.7 6.2 8 9 9 10 11 
Ethane oxidation 5.0 5.8 9 11 10 9 7 
Direct ethanol oxidation 3.1 4.1 1 1 1 1 1 
High pressure carbonylation 4.3 5.2 7 6 6 4 4 
 the cumulative index’s and our method’s rankings. From Figure 5.2, the loadings on 
PC 1 show that Flammability and Heat of reaction are the most variant effects across 
all the routes, while Reactivity and Process Yield vary the least. Methane Oxidation 
and Ethane Oxidation are the most hazardous routes as their respective Flammability 
and Heat of Reaction values are the highest among the routes (see Table 5.2). A natural 
question at this point is which parameters are responsible for the differences between 
the routes? Figure 5.2, which shows the loadings plot on PC 2, can help answer this 
question. The loadings plot on PC2 can be interpreted as the variation from the 
multivariate mean of each factor across the routes. As we can see from Figure 5.2, 
Heat of Reaction, Process Yield, Pressure and Explosiveness are the parameters that 
vary the most from the multivariate mean, and thus they are the factors responsible for 
the differences between the routes. 
When the environmental impact are added, the results are a bit different from 
Palaniappan’s. From Figure 5.3, Direct Ethanol Oxidation is still the most inherently 
safer route. However the most hazardous routes now are Huls Butene Oxidation and 
Halcon Vapor Phase Oxidation. This result is the same when the cumulative index is 
calculated. Figure 5.4 shows that Flammability and HTPI & TTP have the most effect 
on the routes while Process Yield and Reactivity have the least effect.  From Figure 




Figure 5.1: Scores plot of PC1 (Acetic Acid routes without Environmental impact)  
 
Figure 5.2: Loadings plot (Acetic Acid routes without Environmental impact) 
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Figure 5.3: Scores plot of PC1 (Acetic Acid routes with Environmental impact) 
 
Figure 5.4: Loadings plot (Acetic Acid routes with Environmental impact) 
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 This case study reveals the key benefits of the proposed approach: 
(1)  A simple univariate ranking of the routes can be obtained. 
(2) The method is extendable and the additional factors can be added if 
appropriate data is available. 
(3) The analysis results can reveal key differences among the routes. 
(4) The results can also identify the main factors that lead to a route’s safeness 
or malignness – this can help in better process design and risk management. 
5.2 Phenol manufacture 
In this section, we will illustrate the proposed method using routes for Phenol 
manufacturing. Three routes are studied - Cumene Oxidation, Toluene Oxidation, and 
Benzene Oxidation. Information of the reactions in these routes is taken from 
Palaniappan (2001). Values of the parameters selected for each route are shown in 
Table 5.4. The normalized values are calculated in Table 5.5. We eliminate ATP as 
there is no variation across the routes in this parameter. GWP, ODP, PCOP and AP 
columns are also not used in the PCA as their values are not available in the literature.  
After PCA analysis, two PCs are chosen and they explain 94.86% of the 
variance in the original data (without Environmental impact case). We can easily see 
from Figure 5.5 that Toluene is the most inherently safer route. Cumox has three 
reactions, two of them are safer than Benzene. However, if we take the maximum 
possible risk because Cumox-3 reaction scores the most on PC1, Cumox would be the 
most hazardous route; but if we take into account that Cumox has two reactions which 
are safer than Benzene, then Benzene would be the most hazardous route. However, if 
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we look at the cumulative index for each reaction in Table 5.6, Benzene is ranked only 
4 while Cumox-2 and Cumox-3 are ranked 5 and 6 respectively. This means that using 
the cumulative index, Cumox is always the most hazardous route. This case study 
clearly brings out the differences between the multivariate analysis and the cumulative 
index.  
From Figure 5.6, we find that Flammability and Toxicity have the biggest 
effect on the reactions’ benign-ness. Figure 5.6 also reveals that Reactivity, Pressure 
and Temperature vary the most among the routes. Thus any research to improve a 
route should focus on these aspects. 
 When the environmental impact factors are also considered, Benzene is the 
least preferred route while Toluene is the most inherently safer route (see Figure 5.7). 
Figure 5.8 shows that Reactivity, Pressure and Temperature continue to be the factors 
that vary the most among the routes.   
 Table 5.4: Parameters for Phenol manufacturing routes  












& TTP HTPE ATP GWP ODP PCOP AP 
Cumox-1 2 1 7.9 4 -86.52 15 98  70 1400 3.2 6.3 - - 1 - 
Cumox-2 3      3 29.3 3 -121.75 7 96 120 382 49 0.3 - - 0.565 -
Cumox-3 3      3 10.3 3 -255.68 0.3 95 100 317 19 0.3 - - 0.178 -
Toluene-1 2      0 15.7 3 136 3 90 160 2530 750 34 - - 0.563 -
Toluene-2 3    0 6.9 2 134 2 88 250 317 19 32 1 - - -
Benzene     3 0 6.9 3 -259.46 1 99 500 317 3.2 24 270 - 0.189 0.700
- Data not available 
 
 69 
  70 
   
Table 5.5: Scaled parameters for Phenol manufacturing routes 






TTP HTPE ATP GWP ODP PCOP AP
Cumox-1 0.5 0.25 0.079 1 0.25 0.34 0.02 0.201 0.891 0.999 1.000 - - 0.903 - 
Cumox-2  0.75 0.75 0.293 0.75 0.40 0.16 0.04 0.378 0.970 0.979 1.000 - - 0.510 - 
Cumox-3  0.75 0.75 0.103 0.75 0.74 0.97 0.05 0.313 0.975 0.992 1.000 - - 0.161 - 
Toluene-1 0.5 0 0.157 0.75 0.45 0.06 0.10 0.491 0.804 0.683 1.000 - - 0.508 - 
Toluene-2 0.75 0  0.069 0.5 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.675 0.975 0.992 1.000 0 - - -
Benzene  0.75 0 0.069 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.01 0.907 0.975 0.999 1.000 0.027 - 0.171 0.370 
  - Data not available 
Table 5.6: Rankings of Phenol routes using different methods 
Cumulative Index values Without Environmental Impact With Environmental Impact 
Routes 
Without Env. Impact With Env. Impact Palaniappan’s Cumulative Index Our method
Cumulative 
Index Our method 
Cumox-1       2.6 4.5 3 3 2 2
Cumox-2       3.5 5.5 5 4 5 4
Cumox-3       4.4 6.4
3 
6 6 6 6
Toluene-1       2.5 4.0 1 1 1 1
Toluene-2       2.6 4.6
2 
2 2 3 3
Benzene        3.2 5.2 1 4 5 4 5
  
Figure 5.5: Scores plot of PC1 (Phenol routes without Environmental impact) 
 
Figure 5.6: Loadings plot (Phenol routes without Environmental impact) 
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Figure 5.7: Scores plot of PC1 (Phenol routes with Environmental impact) 
 
Figure 5.8: Loadings plot (Phenol routes with Environmental impact) 
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 5.3 Methyl Methacrylate (MMA) manufacture 
Six manufacturing routes for MMA were also compared: 
1. Acetone Cyanohydrin based (ACH) 
2. Ethylene via Propionaldehydebased (C2/PA) 
3. Ethylene via Methyl Propionate based (C2/MP) 
4. Propylene based (C3) 
5. Isobutylene based (i-C4) 
6. Tertiary Butyl Alcohol based (TBA) 
Information for these routes is taken from Lawrence (1996). The values of 
parameters selected for each route and their scaled values are shown in Tables 5.7 and 
5.8 respectively. The Reactivity, ATP, GWP, ODP, PCOP and AP columns are deleted 
as they either have the same values or do not have enough information for analysis. 
Other authors have also studied this process. A comparison with their rankings can be 
performed. Results from Inherent Safety metrics are shown in Table 5.9. PCA results 
are shown in Figures 5.9 – 5.12 for cases of without and with the Environmental 
Impact factors. 
Table 5.9 shows that ACH is the most hazardous route in every method, 
whether the environmental impact is considered or not. Without the environmental 
impact, the proposed method and the cumulative index show that the most inherently 
safer route is TBA, which is in line with Lawrence’s and Khan & Amyotte’s ranking. 
However, when environmental factors are added, our results show that C2/MP is the 
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most inherently safer. This result is also different from the result of the cumulative 
index method, which still points out that TBA is the most inherently safer route. This 
again shows the differences between the multivariate method and the cumulative index 
method. 
In this case, if we use the graph proposed by Gupta and Edwards (2003) with 
our parameters, the graph will become very complicated. For complex routes like 
MMA (each route has many reactions), and with our 15 parameters (which means 
there will be 15 different points on each line of the reaction), their graph becomes 
dense with points, and hence it is very difficult to compare routes. The graph is no 
longer a “simple graphical method’. 
5.4 Discussion 
It is clear from the above illustrations that the multivariate approach can help 
identify and analyze the most “inherently safer” route. The multivariate approach is 
better than previous approaches as it obviates subjective scaling and weighting of the 
effects which can lead to incorrect results. Also, the methodology points out the most 
hazardous property of the process, so that we can know and try to lower its effects on 
the process. Hence, a more thorough risk management can be employed. Moreover, the 
“extendibility” property of the methodology gives it the ability to be used in later 
stages of process design, when more information related to economics, human factors, 
etc. is available. 
 
 Table 5.7: Parameters for MMA manufacturing routes 











TTP HTPE ATP  GWP ODP PCOP AP
ACH-1 4 2 41.2 4 -101.55 3.40 64  1200 104.9 11 0.133 11 - 0.007 1.9
ACH-2    4 2 41.2 4 -38.98 1 91 38 17.8 5 0.133 - - 0.178 -
ACH-3    4 2 9.8 2 706.01 7 98 150 17.8 1 53 - - - -
ACH-4    3 2 29.3 3 811.70 7 100 130 2140 1 53 - - 0.123 -
ACH-5    3 2 10 4 -97.37 1 100 1200 2140 1 34 11 - 0.007 1
ACH-6    3 2 0 0 -98.39 1 99.7 440 152 13 34 - - - 1
C2/PA-1    2 2 70 4 -125.59 15 90.7 30 0 55 15 - - 1 -
C2/PA-2    3 2 66 4 -75.00 49 98.2 185 111 9 13.9 - - 0.421 -
C2/PA-3    3 2 7.1 3 -142.57 3.7 57.75 350 111 70 13.9 - - 0 -
C2/PA-4    3 2 29.3 3 65.38 7.5 75 100 1060 70 72.4 - - 0.123 -
C2/MP-1    2 2 61.5 4 -177.89 100 89 100 5000 55 15 - - 1 -
C2/MP-2    2 2 29.3 3 -151.95 4.5 79 470 2368.3 260 6990 - - 0.123 -
C2/MP-3    2 2 29.3 3 48.36 1 87 350 2368.3 260 53.7 - - 0.123 -
C3-1    3 2 61.5 4 -75.57 100 94.5 70 99 2.6 15 - - 1 1.6
C3-2    3 2 9.4 3 -312.10 10 96.2 90 99 2.6 74.5 - - 0 1.6
C3-3    3 2 9.4 2 -76.02 3 70.5 354 280 70 72.4 - - 0 0
C3-4    3 2 29.3 3 65.38 7.5 75 100 1060 70 72.4 - - 0.123 0
i-C4-1    3 2 7.8 4 -116.28 1.5 41.8 395 111 0 13.9 - - 0.643 -
i-C4-2    3 2 7.1 3 -142.57 3.7 57.75 350 111 70 13.9 - - 0 -
i-C4-3    3 2 29.3 3 49.06 7.5 75 100 1060 70 72.4 - - 0.123 -
TBA-1    3 2 5.6 3 -81.65 4.8 83 350 111 0 13.9 - - 0 -
TBA-2    3 2 7.1 3 -142.57 3.7 58 350 111 70 13.9 - - 0 -
TBA-3    3 2 29.3 3 49.06 7.5 75 100 1060 70 72.4 - - 0.123 -
   - Data not available 
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TTP HTPE ATP GWP ODP PCOP AP 
ACH-1 1 0.5 0.412 1 0.32 0.07 0.36 0.997 0.992 0.995 1.000 0.001 - 0.006 1.003
ACH-2  1 0.5 0.412 1 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.063 0.999 0.998 1.000 - - 0.161 -
ACH-3  1 0.5 0.098 0.5 0.96 0.16 0.02 0.465 0.999 1.000 1.000 - - - -
ACH-4   0.75 0.5 0.293 0.75 0.97 0.16 0.00 0.408 0.834 1.000 1.000 - - 0.111 -
ACH-5   0.75 0.5 0.1 1 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.997 0.834 1.000 1.000 0.001 - 0.006 0.528
ACH-6   0.75 0.5 0 0 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.874 0.988 0.994 1.000 - - - 0.528
C2/PA-1   0.5 0.5 0.7 1 0.41 0.34 0.09 0.025 1.000 0.977 1.000 - - 0.903 -
C2/PA-2   0.75 0.5 0.66 1 0.20 0.76 0.02 0.551 0.991 0.996 1.000 - - 0.380 -
C2/PA-3   0.75 0.5 0.071 0.75 0.48 0.08 0.42 0.803 0.991 0.970 1.000 - - 0.000 -
C2/PA-4   0.75 0.5 0.293 0.75 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.313 0.918 0.970 1.000 - - 0.111 -
C2/MP-1   0.5 0.5 0.615 1 0.59 0.95 0.11 0.313 0.612 0.977 1.000 - - 0.903 -
C2/MP-2   0.5 0.5 0.293 0.75 0.51 0.10 0.21 0.892 0.816 0.890 0.987 - - 0.111 -
C2/MP-3   0.5 0.5 0.293 0.75 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.803 0.816 0.890 1.000 - - 0.111 -
C3-1 0.75 0.5 0.615 1 0.20 0.95 0.06 0.201 0.992 0.999 1.000 - - 0.903 0.845
C3-2  0.75 0.5 0.094 0.75 0.81 0.24 0.04 0.277 0.992 0.999 1.000 - - 0.000 0.845
C3-3  0.75 0.5 0.094 0.5 0.21 0.06 0.30 0.807 0.978 0.970 1.000 - - 0.000 0.000
C3-4  0.75 0.5 0.293 0.75 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.313 0.918 0.970 1.000 - - 0.111 0.000
i-C4-1  0.75 0.5 0.078 1 0.38 0.01 0.58 0.843 0.991 1.000 1.000 - - 0.581 -
i-C4-2  0.75 0.5 0.071 0.75 0.48 0.08 0.42 0.803 0.991 0.970 1.000 - - 0.000 -
i-C4-3  0.75 0.5 0.293 0.75 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.313 0.918 0.970 1.000 - - 0.111 -
TBA-1   0.75 0.5 0.056 0.75 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.803 0.991 1.000 1.000 - - 0.000 -
TBA-2   0.75 0.5 0.071 0.75 0.48 0.08 0.42 0.803 0.991 0.970 1.000 - - 0.000 -
TBA-3   0.75 0.5 0.293 0.75 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.313 0.918 0.970 1.000 - - 0.111 -
- Data not available 
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Table 5.9: Rankings of MMA routes using different methods 
Cumulative Index values Without Environmental Impact With Environmental Impact 
Routes 
Without Env. Impact With Env. Impact Lawrence (1996) 







Index Our method 
ACH-1       4.2 6.1 23 23 23 23
ACH-2       2.6 4.6 3 10 7 13
ACH-3       3.2 5.2 13 13 15 15
ACH-4   3.3 5.2 15 14 14 12 
ACH-5       3.1 5.0 12 20 12 19












C2/PA-1       3.1 5.1 11 8 13 10
C2/PA-2       3.9 5.9 21 21 2 21
C2/PA-3   3.4 5.3 17 16 17 18 












C2/MP-1       4.1 5.7 22 19 20 9
C2/MP-2    3.3 5.0 14 12 11 7












C3-1       3.8 5.8 20 18 21 20
C3-2       3.0 5.0 10 9 10 11
C3-3   2.7 4.7 8 7 8 8 












i-C4-1       3.6 5.6 19 22 19 22
i-C4-2   3.4 5.3 18 17 18 17 












TBA-1       2.9 4.9 9 11 9 14
TBA-2   3.3 5.3 16 15 16 16 














Figure 5.9: Scores plot of PC1 (MMA routes without Environmental impact) 
 
Figure 5.10: Loadings plot (MMA routes without Environmental impact) 
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Figure 5.11: Scores plot of PC1 (MMA routes with Environmental impact) 
Figure 5.12: Loadings plot (MMA routes with Environmental impact) 
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 Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Accidents in chemical plants lead to human injuries, environmental damage, 
and economic loss. The large number and high-impact of accidents in the chemical 
industry in the late 1970s motivated the development of many accident prevention 
methods including the philosophy of “Inherently Safer” design. Inherent Safety 
principles have to be applied to design healthier and environmentally friendlier plants 
early in the design when the process route is selected. This motivates metrics for 
assessing the benign-ness of process routes. Several Inherent Safety indices have been 
proposed in literature. The key precept behind these indices is that the inherent hazard 
of a route can be measured (indirectly) through material properties, reaction 
conditions, process details, etc.  For example, many of the metrics use NFPA Hazard 
ratings of chemicals as a basic measure of Inherent Safety. Routes involving chemicals 
with higher NFPA Hazard ratings are usually considered less benign.  
In this thesis, we have demonstrated the limitation of the NFPA Hazard ratings 
through statistical study of reactive incidents. Specifically we have shown that more 
reactive incidents occur that involve chemicals with smaller NFPA ratings (≤ 2) – 
which runs counter to the inherent assumption of the inherent safety metrics. Further 
we also establish that the consequences of incidents involving chemicals with worse 
NFPA Hazard ratings (≥ 3) is not statistically worse than those involving “safer” 
chemicals. In other words, the NFPA Hazard ratings do not predict incidents very well. 
Hence, in contrast to the implicit assumption in the metrics, low NFPA rated chemicals 
do not make the process safer. This is probably due to the fact that accidents are 
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 dependent on the risk management steps taken as much as on the inherent hazard. All 
else being equal (risk management-wise), a route with safer chemicals will be less 
prone to accidents and suffer less severe consequences. It is apparent that risk 
management is probably a casualty when safer chemicals are involved – thus although 
the inherent hazards are lower, it does not reflect in fewer or milder accidents.  The 
results of this study thus indicate that there is a need for a better approach to assessing 
processes. 
Index-based approaches also suffer from other shortcomings, such as subjective 
scaling of different factors, subjective weighting between them, and limited coverage 
of effects (safety, health, or environmental). We have developed a new multivariate 
approach to comparing the benign-ness of process routes that overcome these 
shortcomings. The method uses PCA method to analyze various factors affecting the 
hazards in the process and disclose the most benign route. Moreover, the methodology 
can also bring out the similarities and differences between the routes. Further, the 
proposed methodology also points out the most hazardous property in a process route, 
so that suitable risk management strategies can be developed. Another key benefit is 
the extendibility of the methodology which allows additional attributes of the design 
such as inventories to be added in later stages of the process design, human factors, or 
economics, as more information become available. The proposed method thus provides 
insights in addition to the route ranking that is offered by the index-based approaches, 
yet it meets the desire for simplicity of use. The application of the methodology has 
been illustrated successfully through three different industrially important case studies.  
The PCA based methodology offers several possibilities for extension. Further 
development can be done by including “credit factors” in the process route such as the 
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 risk minimization features in the design for Process Control, Material Isolation, and 
Fire Protection. Human Factors and Dust Explosion related hazard factors can also be 
included to make the index more comprehensive. However, these additions should not 
be at the expense of complexity. Inherent Safety and simplicity go hand-in-hand; 
future development of the metric should not make the methodology more complex as 
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 Appendix 
List of selected common reactions in many industries 








 Alkylation      
1  Cumene (Isopropyl
benzene) 
Benzene + Propylene Æ Cumene 250 700kPa 6.9 - 







 Esterification      
3     Vinyl acetate C2H4 + CH3COOH + ½O2 Æ 




4     Chloroprene C2H2 Æ Chloroprene 18-24 35kPa 0.35 -
 Halogenation      
5 Chlorine (CH3Cl, CH2Cl2, 
CHCl3, CCl4) 
CH4 Æ Chlorine 340-370 - - - 
6       Ethylene Dichloride C2H4 + Cl2 Æ CH2ClCH2Cl 40-50 - - -
 Hydration      
7 Synthetic ethyl alcohol 
(purer and cheaper than 
from fermentation) 
C2H4 + H2O Æ C2H5OH    300 6.8MPa 67.1 -43.4
 Hydrogenation      
8 Methanol from synthesis 
gas 
CO + H2 Æ CH3OH   250-260 5-8MPa 49.4-79 -
9 Acetone from isopropanol (CH3)2CHOH Æ (CH3)2CO + H2 350   200kPa 2 -
 Nitration      
 89 
 10 Nitroparaffins from paraffin 
and nitric acid 
     400 - - -
 Amination      
11 Ethanolamines Ethylene oxide + Ammonia Æ 3 
amines 
30-40    - - -
12      Methylamines Methanol + Catalyst Æ 
Methylamines 
350-400 2MPa 19.7 -
 Oxidation      
13 Ethylene Glycol Ethylene oxide Æ Ethylene 
Glycol 
60    1atm 1 -
 Hydroformylation      





 Misc.      
15      Carbon Disulfur CH4 + 4S Æ CS2 + 2H2S 700 270kPa 2.7 -
16    Acetylene CaC2 + 2H2O Æ Ca(OH)2 + 
C2H2 
150 204kPa 2 -126
17 Acetylene from Methane 2CH4 Æ C2H2 + 3H2 1500    - - +405
18    Ammonia ½ N2 + 3/2 H2 Æ NH3 100 10MPa 98.7 -51.28
19 Glycerin from Glycerin 
dichlorohydrin 
CH2ClCHClCH2OH + 2NaOH 
Æ CH2OHCHOHCH2OH + 
2NaCl 
96  101kPa 1 - 
20 Vinylacetylene (to make 
Chloroprene) 
2C2H2 Æ CH2=CH_C≡CH3 18-24    35kPa 0.35 -
 Others (in 
PetroChemicals) 
     
21 Nitric from Ammonia  940 Up to 
1MPa 
9.9  -
 Others (in other      
 90 
 industries) 
22  Fuel Cells reaction H2(g) + ½ O2(g) Æ H2O (l) 25 101kPa 1 -286 
23  Industrial gas CH4 + ½ O2 Æ CO2 + 2H2O 
CH4 + CO2 Æ 2CO + 2H2 
CH4 + H2O Æ CO + 3H2 











24 Nitrous oxide NH4NO3 Æ N2O + 2H2O    200 10MPa 98.7 -36.8
25 Thermal Black process to 
produce Carbon Black 
CH4 Æ C (amorph) + 2H2   1100-1650 - - +85
26 Calcination 2CaMg(CO3)2 Æ 2CaO + 2MgO 
+ 4CO2 
-    - - 610.9
27 Slaking 2CaO + 2MgO + 4H2O Æ 
2Ca(OH)2 + 2Mg(OH)2 
-    - - -168
28 Precipitation     2Ca(OH)2 + 2Mg(OH)2 + MgCl2 
+ MgSO4 + 2HO Æ 4Mg(OH)2 + 
CaCl2 + CaSO4.2H2O  
- - - -22.6
29 Calcination      4Mg(OH)2 Æ 4MgO + 4H2O - - - 248.3
30 Hydrochlorination     Mg(OH)2 + 2HCl Æ MgCl2 + 
2H2O 
- - - 44.7
31 Caustic soda NaCl + H2O Æ NaOH + ½ H2 + 
½ Cl2 
-    - - 224
32 Metallic aluminum Al2O3 + 3/2 C Æ 2Al + 3/2 CO2 1000    - - 1100
33 Sodium chlorate NaCl + 3H2O Æ NaClO3 + 3H2 40    - - 937
34 Ammonium nitrate NH3 + HNO3 Æ NH4NO3 -    - - -86.2
35 Benzaledhyde from toluene 
(vapour phase) 
C6H5CH3 Æ C6H5CHO + H2O     500 - - -382
36 Hydrogenation of oils Ni(HCOO)2.2H2O Æ Ni + 2CO2 
+ H2 + 2H2O 
190   200-
700kPa 
2-6.9 -
37 Adipic acid Cyclohexane +2O2 Æ   125 1.03MPa 10.2 -
 91 
 Cyclohexanol + Cyclohexanone 
+ 2H2O 
Cyclohexanol + Cyclohexanone 








38 Dimethyl terephthalate Terephthalic acid Æ Dimethyl 
terephthalate + 2H2O 
150    - - -





40 Nitrobenzene    C6H6 + HNO3 (H2SO4) Æ 
C6H5NO2 + H2O (H2SO4) 
50 - - -113
41 Dimethylaniline    C6H5NH2 + 2CH3OH Æ 
C6H5N(CH3)2 + 2H2O 
200 3.7MPa 36.5 -
42 Manufacture of dyes RNH2 + HNO2 Æ RN2+Cl- + 
2H2O 
If R = Benzene 
If R = α-naphthylamite 
Phthalonitrile + Cu Æ 
Phthalocyanine (copper) 






43 Codeine    Morphine + C6H5N(CH3)3OH + 
C2H5OK Æ Codeine + 
Dimethylaniline + C2H5OH + 
KCl 
130 410kPa 4.1 -
44 Phenolphthalein Phenol + Phthalic Anhydride Æ 
Phenolphthalein 
120    - - -
45  C + O2 Æ CO2 
C + CO2 Æ 2CO 













46  CaCO3 ↔ CaO + CO2 










 47  C + O2 Æ 2CO 
SnO2 + CO Æ SnO + CO2 











48  ZnS + 3/2O2 Æ ZnO + O2 









49  CaO + 3C Æ CaC2 + CO 1900-2200 - - 452 
50  N2 + 3H2 Æ 2NH3  
N2 + O2 Æ 2NO 
4NH3 + 5O2 Æ 4NO + 6H2O 
2NO + O2 Æ 2NO2 





















51      2SO2 + O2 Æ 2SO3 - - - -188.3
52  C + 2S Æ CS2 1000    - - 79.5
53      CH3CH2OH Æ CH3CHO + H2 260-290 - - 82.5
54      CH3CH2OH + 1/2O2 Æ 
CH3CHO + H2O  
500-650 - - -242
55      C2H2 + H2O Æ CH3CHO 68-78 140kPa 1.4 -138.2
56    CH3COOH Æ CH2CO + H2O 700-750 - - 147 
57    CH2CO + CH3COOH Æ 
(CH3CO)2O 
45-55 13-20kPa 0.13-0.2 -63





59     CH2=CH_CH3 + O2 Æ 
CH2=CH_CHO + H2O 
300-320 - - -340.8
60 
61 
 CO + 3H2 Æ CH4 + H2O 









62  Butane Æ 1-Butene + H2 
Butane Æ cis-2-Butene + H2 














 63      C2H4 + H2SO4 Æ C2H5OSO3H 65-85 1-3.5MPa 9.9-34.5 -60
64  CH3OH Æ HCHO + H2 
H2 + ½ O2 Æ H2O 
CH3OH + ½ O2 Æ HCHO + H2O 
HCHO Æ CO + H2 
CH3OH + 3/2 O2 Æ CO2 + 2H2O 
HCHO + O2 Æ CO2 + H2O 





























65     C6H12 Æ C6H6 + 3H2 300-450 1-3MPa 9.9-29.6 206.2
66  4NH3 + 5O2 Æ 4NO + 6H2O 
4NH3 + 4O2 Æ 2N2O + 6H2O 
4NH3 + 3O2 Æ 2N2 + 6H2O 
2NO Æ N2 + O2 













67  3NO2 + H2O Æ 2HNO3 + NO 
 
N2O4 + H2O Æ HNO3 + HNO2 

















68      HOCH2CH2OH Æ HOOCCOOH 
+ 2H2O 
80 10bar 9.9 -
69  2CO + 2CH3OH + ½ O2 Æ 




70  2Na + ½ O2 Æ Na2O 









71  P4 + 5O2 Æ P4O10 










 72  C2H4 + CO + H2 Æ 
CH3CH2CHO 















73  3CH2CH=CH2 + 2H2SO4 Æ 
(CH3)2CHOSO3H + 
[(CH3)2CHO]2SO2 


















74      C3H8 Æ C3H6 + H2 500-700 1atm 1 -







76  SiO2 + 2C Æ Si + 2CO 
3SiO2 + 4Al Æ 3Si + 2Al2O3  














77  C6H5CH2CH3 Æ C6H5CHCH2 + 
H2 
C6H5CH2CH3 Æ C6H6 + C2H4 
C6H5CH2CH3 Æ 8C + 5H2 

















78  2C6H5CH3 + O2 Æ 
C6H5CHCHC6H5 + H20 














79  S + O2 Æ SO2 140-150 - - -297 
80  2FeS2 + 5.5O2 Æ Fe2O3 + 3SO2 
2Fe3O4 + 0.5O2 Æ 2Fe2O3 














 81  2ZnS + 3O2 Æ 2ZnO + 2 SO2     - - - -440
82       H2SO4 Æ SO2 + H2O + 0.5O2 - - - 202
83      FeSO4.7H20 Æ FeSO4.1.5H2O + 
5.5 H20 
130-200 - - 298
84       2H2S + 3O2 Æ 2SO2 + 2H2O 400-1000 - - -518
85  S + 2SO3 Æ 3SO2 110    - - -99
86      CH3COOH + C2H2 Æ 
CH3COOCH=CH2 
60-100 - - -117
87    C2H2 Æ 2C + H2 160-170 40kPa 0.4 -229.4
88     C2H4 + CH3COOH + ½ O2 Æ 
CH3COOCH=CH2 + H20 
- - - -178
89  ZnO + C Æ Zn + CO - - - 353 
                 - Data not available 
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